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Preface 
This report presents findings from the research project “Public Employment Policies for the 
Poor” conducted by the Levy Economics Institute in collaboration with the Korea Employment 
Information Service. At the Levy Institute, the research was conducted jointly by scholars in the 
Distribution of Income and Wealth and Gender Equality and the Economy programs. The central 
objective of the project is to develop a measure of time and income poverty for the Republic of 
Korea that takes into account household production (unpaid work) requirements. Based on this 
new measure, estimates of poverty are presented and compared with those calculated according 
to the official income poverty lines.  
Policies that are in place in Korea to promote gender equality and economic well-being need to 
be reconsidered. The reconsideration should be based on a deeper understanding of the linkages 
between the functioning of labor markets, unpaid household production activities, and existing 
arrangements of social provisioning—including social care provisioning. Our hope is that the 
research reported here and the questions it raises will contribute to this goal.  
We wish to express our gratitude to the Korea Employment Information Service for its financial 
and intellectual support without which this undertaking would not have been possible. The 
results reported here represent our first step in contributing to the understanding of gender 
inequality and constraints faced by low-income households in Korea. We plan to conduct 
additional research on Korea alone, as well as in developing comparisons between Korea and 
other countries as a part of our work on the Levy Institute Measure of Time and Income Poverty.   
vi 
 
Executive Summary 
Official poverty lines in Korea and other countries ignore the fact that unpaid household 
production activities that contribute to the fulfillment of material needs and wants are essential 
for the household to reproduce itself as a unit. This omission has consequences. Taking 
household production for granted when we measure poverty yields an unacceptably incomplete 
picture, and, therefore the estimates based on this omission provide inadequate guidance to 
policymakers. 
Standard measurements of poverty assume that all households and individuals have enough time 
to adequately attend to the needs of household members, including, for example, caring for 
children—tasks absolutely necessary for attaining a minimum standard of living.  But this 
assumption is false. For numerous reasons, some households may not have sufficient time, and 
they thus experience “time deficits.” If a household officially classified as nonpoor has such a 
time deficit and cannot afford to cover it by buying market substitutes (e.g., hiring a care 
provider), that household will encounter hardships not reflected in the official poverty measure. 
To get a more accurate calculus of poverty, we have developed the Levy Institute Measure of 
Time and Income Poverty (LIMTIP), a two-dimensional measure that takes into account both the 
necessary income and household production time needed to achieve a minimum living standard. 
Our estimates for 2008 show that the LIMTIP poverty rate of employed households (i.e., 
households in which either the head or spouse is employed) was about three times higher than 
the official poverty rate (7.5 versus 2.6 percent). The gap between the official and LIMTIP 
poverty rates was notably higher for “nonemployed male head with employed spouse,” “single 
female-headed” and “dual-earner” households. Our estimates of the size of the hidden poor 
suggest that ignoring time deficits in household production resulted in a serious undercount of 
the working poor. The LIMTIP estimates also expose the fact that the income shortfall of the 
poor is greater than implied by the official statistics (₩434,000 compared to ₩246,000 or 1.8 
times greater). Just as with the incidence of poverty, the income shortfall was also greater among 
dual-earner and single-headed households. These findings suggest that serious consideration 
should be given in the design of income support programs to ensure that they (1) broaden their 
coverage to include the hidden poor, and (2) increase the level of support to offset the income 
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shortfall emanating from time deficits. There was a stark gender disparity in the incidence of 
time poverty among the employed, even after controlling for the hours of employment. Time 
poverty is minuscule among part-time (defined as working less than 35 hours per week) male 
workers while it is sizeable among part-time female workers (2 versus 18 percent). Among full-
time workers, the time poverty rate of women is nearly twice that of men (36 versus 70 percent). 
This suggests that the source of the gender difference in time poverty does not lie mainly in the 
difference in the hours of employment; it lies in the greater share of the household production 
activities that women undertake. 
The widespread use of childcare services in Korea allows us to assess the impact of the use of 
these services on time and income poverty. When we account for the use of childcare services in 
our estimates, we see that the income poverty rate of employed households that outsource 
childcare falls from 5.9 percent to 3.1 percent, and that time poverty rates also fall, although 
more so for income-nonpoor households than for income-poor households. We also find that 
time poverty rates for employed individuals with young children that outsource childcare falls 
drastically (from 54 percent to 29 percent). Employed men and women in such households 
benefit as the incidence of time poverty fell from 43 to 26 percent and from 78 percent to 37 
percent, respectively, for men and women. 
Rates of time poverty are also markedly different across the (LIMTIP) income poverty line. 
Time poverty among income-poor households is much higher than among income-nonpoor (80 
versus 55 percent). Similar patterns can also be observed for employed men (71 versus 50 
percent) and employed women (85 versus 74 percent). Since other types of social and economic 
disadvantages tend to accompany income poverty, it is quite likely that the negative effects of 
time poverty will affect the income-poor disproportionately compared to the income-nonpoor. 
We also examined the effectiveness of job creation for poverty reduction via a microsimulation 
model. The simulated scenario assigns each nonemployed but employable adult a job that best 
fits (in a statistical sense) their characteristics (such as age and educational attainment). Under 
the prevailing patterns of pay and hours of employment, we found that a substantial number of 
individuals would escape income poverty as a result of nonemployed persons receiving 
employment: 6.4 percent of individuals (15 to 70 years of age) are in income poverty after the 
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simulation, compared to 8.2 percent before simulation. It is noteworthy that the simulated rate is 
considerably higher than the actual official income poverty rate of 4.3 percent. A large 
proportion of those assigned employment in the simulation enter into the ranks of the time-
deficient working poor or near-poor. 
Tackling the problems of gender inequality and challenges in the economic well-being of the 
low-income working population requires, in addition to creating more jobs, progress toward 
establishing a regime of decent wages, regulating the length of the standard workweek, and 
adopting other measures, such as childcare provisioning. The crucial problem of income and 
time deficits can only be adequately dealt with in such a coherent and integrated manner. 
 
 
 
1 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Two financial crises and the period of jobless growth that followed them have transformed the 
economic and social foundations of modern Korea. Massive firm closures and the adoption of 
liberal labor market policies since the 1997 Asian financial crisis have undermined the 
employment and living conditions of millions of workers. 
The liberalization of the labor market has led to the emergence of a new class of “irregular” 
workers: those who hold fixed-term, part-time employment, or work via an indirect hiring 
arrangement. They perform the same tasks as “regular” workers but without the corresponding 
workers’ benefits or job security (Kim and Park 2006). Irregular workers, despite the inclusion 
of part-time in the definition of this type of arrangement, on average spend almost the same 
amount of time on the job every week as “regular workers.” For instance, in 2009, the average 
daily workload was 8.5 hours among regular workers, while it was 8.2 hours among irregular 
workers. However, despite the similar workloads, irregular workers earn around 60 percent of 
regular workers’ hourly wages, after controlling for sex, age, education, and job experience and 
duration, according to the annual Survey on Working Conditions by Type of Employment.
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Irregular employment has quickly become dominant, as seen in Table 1: the ratio of irregular to 
regular employed workers was 36.7 percent in 2001 and grew to 58.7 percent by 2004, after 
which the ratio gradually declined to 47.7 percent in 2013, in part due to the weak labor demand 
in recent years (Seong 2013). Nonetheless, the ratio remains much higher than in 2001, when 
the data was officially published for the first time.  
As earnings from employment constitute the most important source of income for the majority 
of households, the deteriorating conditions in the labor market raised the poverty rate among 
workers (Lee et al. 2008). Most of the working poor consist of irregular workers, and the fact 
that the poverty rate of employed persons rose from 8.8 to 9.7 percent between 2006 and 2010 
likely reflects a strong effect of irregular employment on poverty (Kim et al. 2011). Yoon 
(2010), Seok (2010), and Lee (2010) found evidence that irregular employment with low wages 
                                                          
1
 Source: 2009 Survey on Working Conditions by Type of Employment, Ministry of Employment and Labor, South 
Korea. 
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increased the likelihood of being poor and lowered the chances of transitioning out of poverty, 
even when the irregular worker was not a primary earner in the household.  
This transformation of the Korean economy has necessitated more women to enter the labor 
market. As a result, women’s labor market participation rate followed a gradual upward 
trajectory: it was 47.1 percent in 1997, 53.9 percent in 2009, and continued its growth to 55.6 
percent in 2013. During the same period, men’s participation rate remained between 77 and 78 
percent. The increase in women’s participation rate was associated with the increase in their 
employment rate from 45.2 to 52.2 percent between 1997 and 2009, and reaching 53.9 percent 
in 2013. Despite the growing presence of women in the labor market, these numbers are still 
below the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) averages of 62 
percent and 57 percent for participation and employment rates, respectively. This is partly due 
to the influence of the unequal division of household production on women’s employment as 
evidenced by the differences in female labor force participation rates by age group. While 
almost 70 percent of women in their late 20s and 65 percent of women in their 40s are 
economically active, only 55 percent of women in their 30s are (Economically Active 
Population Survey, 2010). Gender inequality in the labor markets has also manifested in 
women’s presence among irregular workers: half of them or more were women in most years 
since 2001 (Table 1), while this portion has been less than 38 percent among regular workers. 
Gender inequality is also observed in household production: among the employed persons 
working 36 hours or more a week, women spent more than 2 hours a day on household 
management and caring for other family members while men spent only around 30 minutes a 
day in 2009. The inequality is just as striking among those who worked less than 36 hours a 
week: 3 hours and 26 minutes for women versus 51 minutes for men. 
Table 1 Ratio of Irregular Employment and the Share of Women 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Irregular 36.7 37.7 48.3 58.7 57.8 55.2 56.0 51.1 53.7 50.0 52.1 50.0 47.7 
Women 52.3 49.5 50.4 49.4 50.1 50.4 49.0 50.4 53.4 53.4 53.4 53.7 53.8 
Source: Economically Active Population Survey (labor force survey) from various years. 
The increase in women’s participation in long hours of paid work, coupled with the low wages 
of irregular employment, has surely increased the incidence, as well as the depth, of time 
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deficits among employed persons: too little time is available for the household activities needed 
to maintain the minimum quality of life. Time deficits pose a greater challenge for poor 
households, which may not be able to afford to substitute for the insufficient time with goods 
and services purchased from the market. As women perform the bulk of household production, 
regardless of their paid work hours, the time deficits of employed women are large and their 
consequences for the quality of life of employed women are likely to be significant. 
However, the official poverty measurement in Korea does not account for time deficits and their 
effect, as it is based solely on income. The official poverty threshold is intended to represent the 
minimum cost of living and is estimated from the household expenditure survey. It is 
periodically updated, as the threshold serves as the baseline for public transfers to poor 
households. The official measure does not recognize the need for the time to process and 
produce goods and services at home, which otherwise are to be purchased in the market. To the 
extent that the long hours of paid work interfere with household production, the well-being of 
households and their members is expected to be compromised. The consequent degradation of 
the quality of life should therefore be accounted for in the measurement of poverty. To the best 
of our knowledge, no systematic attempt to account for the time dimension in poverty 
measurement has been made in the case of South Korea.
2
 
We believe that the recent transformations in the conditions of employment and poverty in 
Korea warrant, more than ever, a reconsideration of the official measure of poverty. Policies to 
combat poverty and promote equality require a deeper and more detailed understanding of the 
linkages between conditions of employment, unpaid household production, and existing 
arrangements of social provisioning—including social care provisioning. This nexus creates 
distinct binding constraints for different types of households and individuals, and especially for 
men and women. Anti-poverty policies will be much more effective if they take this nexus into 
account. 
 
                                                          
2
 Noh and Kim (2010) applied the framework of Vickery (1977) to the 1
st
 wave of the Korean Welfare Panel Study 
that contains recall data on approximate time spent on household activities. The data, however, suffers from a 
severe recall bias. Their study also did not consider the role of household composition in determining the required 
time for household production. 
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Our measurement framework is used in an attempt to lay bare the time-income nexus and 
provide an empirical picture of the problems that it can produce. Customarily, income poverty 
incidence is judged by the ability of individuals and households to gain access to some level of 
minimum income based on the premise that such access ensures the fulfilment of basic material 
needs. However, this approach neglects to take into account the necessary (unpaid) household 
production requirements, without which basic needs cannot be fulfilled. In fact, the two are 
interdependent and evaluations of standards of living ought to consider both dimensions. 
Households differ in terms of their household production requirements because of demographic 
differences—principally in terms of size and composition—among them. Households also differ 
in terms of the time their members have available to meet the requirements, and it should not be 
assumed that all households can meet these requirements. In order to promote gender equality, it 
is imperative to understand how labor force participation and earnings interact with household 
production responsibilities, as it is already well-established that women contribute a 
disproportionate share of unpaid work time. 
The rest of the report has the following structure. In the next section, we discuss our measure of 
time and income poverty (Section 2). This section also discusses the data and empirical 
methodology.  Key findings regarding the patterns of time and income poverty are presented 
and discussed in Section 3. We then discuss the findings from our microsimulation of the 
scenario in which all employable adults in income-poor households receive employment 
(Section 4). The concluding section (Section 5) considers the policy implications of the study. 
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2 MEASUREMENT FRAMEWORK AND EMPIRICAL 
METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this section is to describe the model underpinning our measurement of time and 
income poverty. We also describe the sources of data and methodology that we employed in 
implementing the measure.  
2.1 A model of Time and Income Poverty 
Our model builds on earlier models that explicitly incorporate time constraints into the concept 
and measurement of poverty (Vickery 1977; Harvey and Mukhopadhyay 2007). The key 
differences between our approach and the earlier models are that we explicitly take into account 
intrahousehold disparities in time allocation and do not rely on the standard neoclassical model 
of time allocation. A detailed comparison of the alternative models has been discussed 
elsewhere (Zacharias 2011).  The empirical methodology followed to implement the model has 
been elaborated in the context of three Latin American countries (Zacharias, Antonopoulos and 
Masterson 2012). 
We undertook a revision of the basic model in order to account for the outsourcing of childcare. 
Let the time deficit/surplus faced by the working-age individual   in household   be denoted as 
   ; minimum required time for personal care and nonsubstitutable household activities as ; 
the minimum amount of substitutable household production as  ; the fraction of the threshold 
hours of household production that falls upon the individual as    ; and,    is the time spent on 
income generation (wage or own-account employment). 
To account for the impact of outsourcing of childcare, we also introduce   
 
 to represent the free 
(i.e., requiring no monetary outlays by the household) outsourced hours of childcare,   
 
 the 
purchased hours of childcare and     the share of outsourced hours that goes toward relieving 
the childcare obligations of the individual. We can then express the individual’s time deficit as: 
                           
    
 
) (1)  
6 
 
In the equation above,   , the time spent on income generation, is defined so as to also include 
the time spent on commuting to work, simply to avoid clutter.  The threshold value of personal 
care reflects the time requirements for certain basic activities such as sleeping, eating and 
drinking, personal hygiene, some minimum rest, etc. We also make allowance for some minimal 
requirement of time for certain nonsubstitutable household activities (i.e., activities that are, in 
general, hard to outsource). The combined total requirements of personal care and 
nonsubstitutable activities is represented by .
3
 
As we discussed earlier, income poverty thresholds in Korea, as in other countries, do not take 
into account the fact that people with poverty-level income may not have enough time to engage 
in the household production activities that they need to perform in order subsist with that level 
of income. The amount of substitutable household production time that is implicit in the poverty 
line (  ) varies among households depending on the number of adults and children in the 
household.  
Numerous studies based on time use surveys have documented that there are well-entrenched 
disparities in the division of household production tasks among the members of the household, 
especially between the sexes. Women tend to spend far more time in household production 
relative to men. Studies based on time use surveys in Korea have shown that women spent over 
3 hours a day on household production while men spent only 37 minutes in 2009, according to a 
2009 Korean time use survey. Although women’s burden declined from over 4 hours a day in 
1999 while men’s time remained unchanged, the gender gap remains remarkably high (Kwon 
2007; Lee, Kawaguchi and Hamermesh 2012). The parameter     is meant to capture these 
                                                          
3
 Vickery (1977, p.46) defined this as the minimum amount of time that the adult member of the household is 
required to spend on “managing the household and interacting with its members if the household is to function as a 
unit.” She assumed that this amounted to 2 hours per day or 14 hours per week. Harvey and Mukhopadhyay (2007) 
made no allowance for this. Burchardt (2008, p.57) included a minimal amount of parental time for children that 
cannot be substituted. It is arguable that the inclusion of activities of “managing the household” in this category 
might be double-counting, if we include household management activities in the definition of household 
production. However, it can also be argued that most of the nonsubstitutable time consists of the time that the 
household members spent with each other and that the poverty-level household production (discussed in the next 
paragraph in the text) does not include a “realistic” amount of time for household management. In practice, this is a 
relatively small amount of time and, therefore, either methodological choice would have no appreciable effect on 
the substantive findings. 
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disparities. It is the share of an individual in the total time that their household needs to spend in 
household production to survive with the poverty level of income. 
Free (unpaid) childcare (  
 
) can be rendered by non-household members (e.g., relatives or 
friends). Some time use surveys do collect information on care rendered by the respondent to 
non-household children but information on hours spent on (unpaid) care of household children 
by non-household members is generally not collected.
4
 Free childcare can also be provided by 
the government either via direct provisioning or noncash transfers. Hours of care received in this 
manner are generally not recorded in time use surveys because of their focus on collecting 
information on how respondents spend their time.
 
In the Korean context, the government 
operated a means-tested voucher system to enable families to utilize the services of childcare 
centers for their children.
5
 Purchased hours of childcare (  
 
) are also generally not available in 
time use surveys.
6
 
Both free and purchased hours of childcare can relieve the time deficits that the individual may 
face. Hence, they are entered in our equation for time deficit (equation (1) above) with a plus 
sign. However, the extent of such relief can differ among the individuals in the household. For 
example, sending the child to a childcare center may relieve the caring responsibility shouldered 
by a mother more than a father. The parameter     aims to capture such intrahousehold 
differences in the apportionment of outsourced childcare.  
The difference between the total hours in a week and the sum of the minimum required time that 
the individual has to spend on personal care and household production, net of outsourced hours 
                                                          
4
 Kim et.al (2011) are some of a few that have attempted to estimate time use of such childcare arrangements, using 
the Korean Longitudinal Survey of Women and Families of 2008. They find that only a small percentage of 
households, 6.7 percent, use childcare by non-household members. However, there is no information as to if the 
care is provided for free or not. Given the insignificant contribution of the particular type of childcare in aggregate 
terms, we do not explicitly take it into account in our conceptual model. 
5
 In 2008, the childcare subsidies were offered to households with income below 100 percent of average urban 
households, with varying degrees of support by income levels. As of the end of September, 575,771 children under 
age 5 received the subsidies (source: 2008 Childcare Statistics, Bureau of Childcare Policies, Ministry of Health 
and Welfare). 
6
 There is a strong rationale for collecting information regarding the hours of outsourced hours of care (free and 
purchased) in time use surveys because they exert a strong influence on individual and family time allocation. Since 
this information cannot be collected via the time diaries of the respondents, it has to be collected via a series of 
carefully designed questions.  
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of childcare, is the notional time available to them for income generation and “leisure.” We have 
defined the time deficit/surplus accruing to the individual as the excess or deficiency of hours of 
income-generating activity compared to the notional available time. To derive the time deficit at 
the household level, we add up the time deficits of the   individuals in the household: 
    ∑      
 
   
     (2)  
Now, if the household has a time deficit (i.e.,     ) then it is reasonable to consider that 
deficit as a shortfall in time with respect to   ; that is, we assume that the household does not 
have enough time to perform the minimum required amount of substitutable household 
production.  
A crucial point to note in this expression is that we are not allowing the time deficit of an 
individual in the household to be compensated by the time surplus of another individual in the 
same household. This is a sharp contrast to the usual assumption of “unitary” households found 
in the mainstream literature. The significance of the difference can perhaps be illustrated by 
considering the time allocation of the husband and wife in a hypothetical family where both are 
employed. Suppose that the wife suffers from a time deficit because she has a full-time job and 
also performs the major share of housework; and, suppose that the husband has a time surplus 
because after returning home from work he does very little housework. Adding up the husband’s 
time surplus and the wife’s time deficit to derive the total time deficit for the household would 
be equivalent to assuming that the husband automatically changes his behaviour to relieve the 
time deficit faced by the wife. In contrast, we assume that no such automatic substitution takes 
place within the household, since we do not observe this substitution in operation in the time use 
data that we use. 
If the minimal assumptions behind the equations set out above are accepted as reasonable, then 
it follows that there is a fundamental problem of inequity that is inherent in the poverty 
thresholds if the deficits in the necessary amounts of household production are not taken into 
account. Consider two households which are identical in all respects, and which also happen to 
have an identical amount of money income. Suppose that one household does not have enough 
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time available to devote to the necessary amount of household production while the other 
household has the necessary available time. To treat the two households as equally income-poor 
or income-nonpoor would be inequitable towards the household with the time deficit. 
The problem of inequity can be resolved by revising the income thresholds. If we assume that 
the time deficit in question can be compensated by market substitutes, the natural route is to 
assess the replacement cost. Since we do take purchased hours of childcare into account, we also 
have to include the expenditures incurred for this purpose in altering the thresholds. 
Specifically, the purchased hours of childcare to be included in the adjustment of the income 
threshold should be capped at the time deficit that the household would have faced without any 
childcare expenditure.
7
 
If we let   
  denote the purchased hours of childcare to be taken into account in the modification 
of the income threshold and   ̃ denote the household time deficit in the absence of purchased 
childcare we can express the notion discussed above as: 
   
  min    ̃    
   (3)  
where: 
   ̃   ∑      
 
   
 ̃     (4)  
and 
  ̃                        
 
 (5)  
 
 
                                                          
7
 In the absence of such a cap, we would raise the income threshold of households that can afford to spend on 
childcare beyond the hours required to eliminate the time deficit; potentially, we might end up classifying some 
officially nonpoor and time-nonpoor households as falling below the LIMTIP income threshold. This would be 
self-contradictory in the sense that the LIMTIP income poverty threshold is meant to add to the ranks of the 
income-poor only a subset of households that have incomes above the official poverty line and are time-poor. 
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The income poverty threshold is now the sum of the standard poverty line, monetized value of 
time deficit, and cost of purchased hours (capped at the time deficit that would have existed in 
the absence of purchased hours): 
   
    ̅     
    
   
  (6)  
In the equation above,   
  is the adjusted (LIMTIP) income threshold,   ̅ the official poverty line, 
   is the hourly replacement cost of household production and   
  is the hourly cost of childcare. 
We allow the cost of childcare to vary across households because the number of young children 
requiring childcare can differ across households; there are other factors, too, that can enter into 
play here, e.g., the possibility that while some may pay a subsidized rate, others may pay the 
average market rate. 
The thresholds for time allocation and modified income threshold together constitute a two-
dimensional measure of time and income poverty. We consider the household to be income-
poor if its income,  , is less than its adjusted threshold, and we term the household as 
time-poor if any of its members has a time deficit: 
      
   income poor household        time poor household (7)  
For the individuals in the household, we deem them to be income-poor if the income of the 
household to which they belong is less than the adjusted threshold, and we designate them 
as time-poor if they have a time deficit: 
      
    income poor person   or        time poor person (8)  
The LIMTIP allows us to identify the “hidden” income-poor—households with income above 
the standard threshold but below the modified threshold—who would be neglected by official 
poverty measures and therefore by poverty alleviation initiatives based on the standard income 
thresholds. By combining time and income poverty, the LIMTIP generates a four-way 
classification of households and individuals: (a) income-poor and time-poor; (b) income-poor 
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and time-nonpoor; (c) income-nonpoor and time-poor; and (d) income-nonpoor and time-
nonpoor.   
2.2 Empirical Methodology and Data 
2.2.1 Statistical Matching 
The measurement of time and income poverty requires microdata on individuals and households 
with information on time spent on household production, time spent on employment, and 
household income.  Given the importance of intrahousehold division of labor in our model, it is 
necessary to have information on the time spent on household production by all persons
8
 in 
multi-person households. Good data on all the relevant information required are not available in 
a single survey. But, good information on household production was available in the time use 
survey (KTUS 2009), and good information regarding time spent on employment and household 
income was available in the Korean welfare panel survey of 2009.
9
 Our strategy was to 
statistically match the welfare survey and KTUS surveys so that hours of household production 
can be imputed for each individual aged 10 years and older in the welfare survey.
10
  Basic 
information regarding the surveys is shown in Table 2. 
Table 2 Surveys Used in Constructing the Levy Institute Measure of Time and Income Poverty 
Survey subject Name Sample size 
Income and earnings  Korea Welfare Panel Study, 2009 
16,255 persons in 6,207 households. 
There were 14,502 individuals aged 
10 years or older. 
Time use  Time Use Survey, Korea, 2009 
22,812 persons in 10,639 households. 
Completed time diaries were 
available for 20,263 individuals that 
were 10 years or older. 
 
 
                                                          
8
 Our basic concern is that we should have information regarding household production by both spouses (partners) 
in married-couple (cohabitating) households, and information on older children, relatives (e.g., aunt), and older 
adults (e.g., grandmother) in multi-person households.  
9
 More information on the preparation of the two data files for the purposes of our study is in the report 
“Documentation on Data Cleaning and Alignment” (by Kijong Kim) that we submitted earlier. 
10
 The universe of the KTUS 2009 consisted of persons 10 years and older. 
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The surveys are combined to create the synthetic file using constrained statistical matching 
(Kum and Masterson 2010). The basic idea behind the technique is to transfer information from 
one survey (“donor file”) to another (“recipient file”). In this study, the donor file is the time use 
survey and the recipient file is the welfare survey. Time allocation information is missing in the 
recipient file but is necessary for our research purposes. Each individual record in the recipient 
file is matched with a record in the donor file, where a match represents a similar record, based 
on several common variables in both files. The variables are hierarchically organized to create 
the matching cells for matching procedure. Some of these variables are considered as strata 
variables (i.e., categorical variables that we consider to be of the greatest importance in 
designing the match). For example, if we use sex and employment status as strata variables, this 
would mean that we would match only individuals of the same sex and employment status. 
Within the strata, we use a number of variables of secondary importance as match variables. The 
matching progresses by rounds in which strata variables are dropped from matching cell 
creation in reverse order of importance. 
The matching is performed on the basis of the estimated propensity scores derived from the 
strata and match variables. For every recipient in the recipient file, an observation in the donor 
file is matched with the same or nearest neighbour based on the rank of their propensity scores. 
In this match, a penalty weight is assigned to the propensity score according to the size and 
ranking of the coefficients of strata variables not used in a particular matching round. The 
quality of match is evaluated by comparing the marginal and joint distributions of the variable 
of interest in the donor file and the statistically matched file (see Appendix A for a detailed 
description of the statistical matches). 
2.2.2 Estimating Time Deficits 
We estimated time deficits for individuals aged 18 to 70 years. We restrict our attention to 
individuals in this age group because they perform the overwhelming bulk of paid work (98 
percent) and account for most of the household production labor performed in the economy (84 
percent).  
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To estimate time deficits (see equation (2) above), we require information on: 
1. weekly hours of required personal maintenance and nonsubstitutable household 
production;  
2. weekly hours of required substitutable household production; 
3. actual weekly hours of free and purchased childcare; 
4. actual weekly hours the individual spends on income generation; and 
5. required weekly hours of commuting. 
The hours of required personal maintenance were estimated as the sum of minimum necessary 
leisure time (assumed to be equal to 14 hours per week)
11
 and the weekly average (for all 
individuals aged 18 to 70 years) of the time spent on essential activities of personal care, 
estimated using data from the time use survey.
12
 We assumed that the hours of nonsubstitutable 
household activities were equal to 7 hours per week. The resulting estimates are shown below in 
Table 3. The line labelled “Total” is our estimate of the weekly hours of required personal 
maintenance and nonsubstitutable household production, and applies uniformly to every adult. 
Table 3 Thresholds of Personal Maintenance and Nonsubstitutable Household Activities (Weekly 
Hours, Persons Aged 18 to 70 Years) 
Personal maintenance 90 
Personal care 76 
Sleep 54 
Eating and drinking 12 
Hygiene and dressing 8 
Rest 2 
Necessary minimum leisure 14 
Nonsubstitutable household activities 7 
Total 97 
Source: KTUS 2009 
                                                          
11
 It should be noted that 14 hours per week was approximately 17.5 hours less than the median value of the time 
spent on leisure (sum of time spent on social, cultural activities, entertainment, sports, hobbies, games and mass 
media). We preferred to set the threshold at a substantially lower level than the observed value for the average 
person in order to ensure that we do not end up “overestimating” time deficits due to “high” thresholds for 
minimum leisure. 
12
 The KTUS contained two diaries for each respondent. We multiplied the time allocated (measured in minutes) to 
each activity in each diary by a conversion factor and then added up the amounts of time spent on the activity over 
the two diaries. The conversion factor was set equal to: (a) 3.5 if both diaries were completed on weekdays or 
weekends (Saturday and Sunday); and (b) 5 for the weekday diary and 2 for the weekend diary if the two diaries 
were completed, respectively, on a weekday and weekend day (Saturday or Sunday). We converted the total weekly 
minutes spent on each activity into weekly hours by dividing by 60. 
14 
 
The hours of required household production depend on the household-level threshold of 
household production and the individual’s share in the household-level threshold. The 
thresholds for household production hours are set at the household level; that is, they refer to the 
total weekly hours of household production to be performed by the members of the household, 
taken together. In principle, they represent the average amount of household production that is 
required to subsist at the poverty level of income. The reference group in constructing the 
thresholds consists of households with at least one nonemployed adult and income around the 
poverty line. Our definition of the reference group is motivated by the need to estimate the 
amount of household production implicit in the official poverty line. Since poor households in 
which all adults are employed may not be able to spend the amount of household production 
implicit in the poverty line, we excluded such households from our definition of the reference 
group. 
Unfortunately, our preferred source of data for estimating the thresholds, the time use survey, 
did not contain any information regarding the income poverty status of households. Therefore, 
we had to impute membership in the group of households with income around the poverty line. 
We did this by using the predicted probability of being within the poverty band by means of a 
probit estimation. 
We begin by constructing a household income measure for households in the time use data. For 
each individual, we create a personal income variable using the midpoint of the categories of the 
existing personal income variable, and replacing the top category (over ₩5,000,000) with 
₩6,000,000. The household income is then created by summing these across all members of the 
household. This results in a household income distribution in the time use data that has a 
substantially lower mean than that in the welfare data (₩2.6 million versus ₩3.5 million). We 
normalize the household income data in the welfare and time use data separately, in order to 
produce similar distributions for the probit estimation and prediction. 
We then proceed to run probit estimations on each of the reference group categories for the 
required household production (12 combinations of number of adults [one to three or more] and 
number of children [zero to three or more] in the household) in the KWPS. The dependent 
variable is an indicator of presence in the poverty band and the independent variables are 
15 
 
standardized household income, number of persons in the household, a set of dummies for seven 
regions of the country, the sex of the household head, the age and square of age of the 
household head, dummies for family type, dummies for tenure status, dummies for the type of 
housing unit, the number of earners in the household, and the level of education of the 
household head. The results of the estimation are used to predict the presence of the household 
in the poverty band for all household records in both the time use and the welfare data. We 
estimate the latter in order to assess the quality of the procedure. The results for the procedure 
are presented in Table 4. As we can see, the rate of misprediction is quite low, at 8.5 percent. In 
addition, the highest income of those households in the welfare data that were miscategorized as 
being within the poverty band was ₩3.5 million, which is not too far above the maximum 
poverty line for welfare data of ₩2.2 million. This gives us confidence in our estimates and 
imputed membership status of households in the poverty band was used to identify the reference 
group in the time use survey. 
Table 4 Comparison of Membership in the Poverty Band and Predicted Presence in the Poverty 
Band in KWPS 2009 
 
Note: “0” indicates nonmembership and “1” indicates membership in the poverty band. 
We divided the reference group into 12 subgroups based on the number of children (0, 1, 2, and 
3 or more) and number of adults (1, 2, and 3 or more) for calculating the thresholds. The 
thresholds were calculated on the basis of the average values of the time spent on household 
production by households in each subgroup of the reference group. The estimates obtained are 
shown below in Figure 1.  
  Predicted Poverty
0 1
0 80.63 4.05 84.68
1 4.44 10.88 15.32
Total 85.07 14.93 100
Total
Poverty 
Band
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Figure 1 Threshold Hours of Household Production (Weekly Hours Per Household) 
 
Source: KTUS 2009, with the Levy Institute’s imputation of membership in the income-poverty band 
Our assumption is that the required hours should show a positive gradient with respect to adults 
and a positive gradient with respect to children. That is, the hours of required household 
production for the household as a whole should increase when there are more adults in the 
household, and when there are more children in the household. We think that this is a reasonable 
assumption. Actual hours estimated from the sample data, however, did not satisfy our 
assumption in a few cases. This could be due to a variety of reasons.
13
 The estimates shown in 
Figure 1 were therefore derived on the basis of some adjustments. The first adjustment was 
regarding households with one adult and three or more children, which constituted only a small 
fraction of all households (about 0.3 percent in 2009). In this case, instead of the estimates 
obtained for the reference group, we obtained the threshold by adding to the threshold amount 
of the 1-adult+2-kids group, the difference between the threshold amounts of the 2-adult+3-kids 
and 2-adults+2 kids subgroups in the reference group.  The second adjustment was made for 
households with three or more adults and 2 or 3+ children. The number of observations in the 
reference group for these subgroups was far too small. To overcome this problem, we relaxed 
the criteria for the reference group: enough observations can be found when we drop the 
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 Such as small numbers of observations for some of the subgroups in the reference group. 
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requirement of having incomes in the poverty band. In other words, for these subgroups we use 
the average values for households with at least one nonemployed adult.
14
 
After we estimated the threshold hours of household production, we determined the share of 
each individual in the household in household production. This was done using the matched 
data. We assumed that the share of an individual in the threshold hours would be equal to the 
share of that individual in the observed total hours of household production in their household. 
Consider the hypothetical example of a household with only two adults. If the matched data 
showed that the adults spent an equal amount of time in household production, we divided the 
threshold value of 38 hours equally between them. However, the equal sharing of housework 
between the sexes is the exception rather than the norm, as indicated in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 Person's Share in the Total Hours of Household Production (Percent) by Sex, Persons 18 
to 70 Years of Age 
 
Source: Authors’ estimate from the Levy Institute’s synthetic file created from KWPS and KTUS 
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 Overall, the adjustments described above affected the thresholds of about 5 percent of households in the sample.  
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The bottom and top edges of the box indicate the intra-quartile range (IQR), i.e., the range of 
values between the 25th and 75th percentiles. The marker inside the box indicates the mean 
value. The line inside the box indicates the median value.  The picture clearly shows that men’s 
share is much lower, as most of the distribution for men lies beneath most of the distribution for 
women. 
Actual weekly hours of free and purchased childcare (  
 
and   
 
) were obtained via a process of 
imputation based on the reported values of out-of-pocket expenditures on childcare (out-of-
pocket costs, or OOPCs) and childcare vouchers received by the household. We carried out the 
imputation for households that had at least one young child (i.e., a person 6 years or younger). 
From a policy standpoint, because the voucher system is available only to young children, it 
makes sense to examine the effects that it has on the time and income poverty of households 
with young children. As a practical matter, it is also the case that the overwhelming portion of 
childcare expenditures is incurred by households with young children. Thus, making 
adjustments to their income and time poverty status in light of outsourced childcare is likely to 
have a considerable impact compared to other households. 
We imputed the hours in successive stages by utilizing the information on OOPCs and the value 
of vouchers. First, we derived an estimate of the average hourly cost of unsubsidized care per 
child (of a given age). This hourly cost was used to construct an hourly cost for all children in 
the household because OOPC is not reported separately for individual children in the household. 
Using the latter, we calculated the hours of care obtained by OOPC. In the next stage, we 
derived the hours of care financed by vouchers as a residual from the maximum hours of full-
time care for households that incurred OOPC and received vouchers. Then, the hours of care 
financed by vouchers for households that received only vouchers were imputed on the basis of 
the hours of such care obtained by households that, in addition to receiving the vouchers, spent 
very little of their own money on childcare. Finally, the share of outsourced hours that goes 
toward relieving the childcare obligations of the individual (   ) were approximated by the 
actual share of the individual in the total household hours of childcare. Full details of the 
procedure are provided in Appendix B. 
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We derived the thresholds for commuting time to work from the time use survey. Our 
exploratory analysis showed that the hours of employment had an important impact on the hours 
of commuting. Since we cannot reasonably assign commuting time for each possible hour of 
employment, we assigned thresholds based on the full-time versus part-time employment status 
of the worker. We considered a worker as a part-time worker if their weekly hours of work were 
35 hours or less. Our estimates showed that the average commuting time for part-time and full-
time workers (in the age group 18 to 70 years) were respectively, 4.40 and 7.15 hours per week. 
We assumed that they constitute the threshold values of commuting. 
The final step in calculating the time deficits for individuals consists of obtaining the actual 
weekly hours of employment. About 30 percent of employed persons did not report weekly 
hours of employment; instead, they reported average daily hours of work. There is no 
information about average days worked in a week; but, average days worked during a month is 
available in the data file for all employed persons. We first multiplied the daily hours with days 
worked per month to obtain monthly hours; then, we converted them into weekly hours by 
dividing by 4. We assume that the resulting variable represents the weekly hours of employment 
for those who did not report it. For those who reported it, we used the values in the datafile.
15
 As 
is well known, women have much lower levels of labor market activity in Korea: for those in 
the age group of 18 to 70 years, the median value of weekly hours of employment for women 
was 7 compared to 42 for men (Figure 3). 
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 Over 90 percent of those who did not report weekly hours were “full-year worked,” i.e., they worked for 12 
months. 
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Figure 3 Weekly Hours of Employment by Sex, Persons 18 to 70 Years of Age 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates from the KWPS  
The steps described above yielded information sufficient to estimate the time deficits for all 
individuals aged 18 to 70 years. The household-level value of time deficits can then be obtained 
in a straightforward manner by summing the time deficits of individuals in the household. 
2.2.3 Adjusted Poverty Thresholds 
We employed the thresholds constructed by the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs as 
our “official” poverty thresholds. The thresholds are shown in Table 5. 
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Table 5 Official Poverty Line, 2008 
Household 
Size 
Poverty 
Line 
1 463,047 
2 784,319 
3 1,026,603 
4 1,265,848 
5 1,487,878 
6 1,712,186 
7 1,936,494 
8 2,160,802 
9 2,385,110 
10 2,609,418 
11 2,833,726 
Source: Kim et al. (2010) 
Accounting for time deficits requires the modification of the official threshold (equation (4). 
The modification consists of adding the monetized value of household time deficit, net of the 
cost of purchased childcare hours (capped at the time deficit that would have existed in the 
absence of purchased hour) to the threshold. We assume that the hourly value of time deficit 
(  ) is equal to the average hourly wage of domestic workers, an assumption that is widely 
made in research on the valuation of household production. Unfortunately, detailed occupational 
coding was not available in the Korean microdata on workers to identify domestic workers 
directly.
16
 A further difficulty was posed by the fact that the survey with the largest sample size 
and most detailed industry and occupation classification—the economically active population 
survey—did not collect information on earnings. As a result, we had to resort to using the 
average hourly wage estimated from a survey of firms (Wage Structure Survey in Korea). The 
hourly wage amounted to ₩6,316. It is quite likely that the hourly wage of domestic workers 
employed by firms is higher than that of domestic workers that work informally. As a result, the 
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 Ideally, we would have preferred to use the wages of workers classified as “domestic and related helpers, 
cleaners and launderers” (ISCO code 913). 
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value of time deficits estimated by our method is perhaps biased upwards. The derivation of our 
estimate of the hourly cost of purchased childcare (  
 ) is discussed in Appendix B. 
Both the official poverty line and poverty line adjusted by the value of time deficits are 
compared against a measure of household income to assign poverty status. For our purposes 
here, we use gross money income as the relevant measure. We constructed the gross money 
income in the welfare survey by adding up the following sources of household income: wage 
and salaries; business income; capital income; social security; social insurance and assistance; 
and private transfers including transfers by other family members, private insurance, and other 
organizations. 
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3 INCOME AND TIME POVERTY 
3.1 Hours of Employment, Time Deficits and Earnings 
The distinctive feature of our approach to the understanding of low-income persons and 
households is the focus on time deficits. Therefore, the natural starting point is to examine the 
nature and extent of time deficits among persons. It may be recalled from the earlier discussion 
that we estimated time deficits for persons between 18 and 70 years of age because they form 
the overwhelming bulk of the labor force. 
Time poverty among persons in Korea is almost exclusively a phenomenon restricted to 
employed persons. As in many other countries, there is a notable gender gap in the employment 
rates of men and women in Korea: 75 versus 51 percent among persons between the ages of 18 
and 70 years, our study population. The labor force participation of men and women are 
trending in opposite directions. While the participation rate of men over 15 years old declined 
from 74.7 to 73.3 percent, the women’s rate increased from 49.0 to 49.9 percent between 2003 
and 2012. While women’s participation in their 20s is as high as that of men, it drops to 56 
percent among women in their 30s and does not reach back to the premarital level. Lee, Kang, 
and Sarkar (2008) find that marriage and family formation play a large role in women’s 
withdrawal from the labor market. Kum and Yoon (2011) find that married women’s 
participation has increased since the Asian financial crisis. The increase in double-earner 
households amid decreasing employment stability signifies the need to maintain an adequate 
level of income. The supplementary motive of women’s participation is evident, especially 
among the low-income households.  
For employed individuals, time deficits occur when their hours of employment exceed the time 
available to them, after setting aside the time needed for personal care and necessary household 
production from the physically fixed number of hours (168 hours per week), and adding the 
outsourced hours of childcare (see equation 1).
17
 There were roughly 9.4 million time-poor 
persons and the majority of them (nearly 4.9 million or 55 percent) were women.  
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 Our measurement framework allows for another type of time poverty, which occurs when the time available to 
the individual, even before taking into account their hours of employment, turns out to be negative. An earlier study 
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As we would expect, the rate of time poverty increases as the weekly hours of employment rise 
for both men and women. But, the gender gap in incidence was fairly large: 33 percent for men 
versus 55 percent for women. The gender gap is visible in every hours interval, except in the 
very bottom (less than 20 hours) and top (61 hours or more) intervals (Figure 4). Roughly half 
of men and women workers worked 36 to 50 hours per week. Here, the rate of time poverty 
among women was 3.9 times as high as among men. The contrast between men and women in 
terms of hours of employment lies in the greater incidence of part-time (less than 35 hours) 
work: about 25 percent of women workers work part-time compared to only 11 percent of 
men.
18
  Some studies have attributed the greater incidence of part-time work among women to 
their greater responsibilities at home (e.g.,Hwang 2004; Jeong 2010). However, it is also quite 
clear that the dramatic growth in part-time work occurred after the 1997–1998 crisis. 
Figure 4 Incidence of Time Poverty by Weekly Hours of Employment and Sex (Percent) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
using the framework found that in Argentina and Mexico, such individuals (almost entirely women) made up 
roughly 20 percent of all time-poor individuals while, in Chile, they constituted a smaller fraction at 13 percent 
(Zacharias, Antonopoulos and Masterson, 2012:54). This type of time poverty can be thought of as a “housework 
time-bind” because it results exclusively from the higher burden of household production that falls upon women. 
18
 This ILO definition may not coincide with the hourly- and full-day employment by contract used in the Korean 
Labor Force Survey. For the purpose of estimating time deficit, it was necessary to utilize the information related to 
work hours rather than to contractual characteristics of employment. Based on the contractual characteristics of 
employment, the part-time rates are 12.7 and 4.0 percent for women and men in 2008, which are less than half of 
the ratios based on the usual hours of work. 
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One potential reason behind the higher rate of time poverty of one group vis-à-vis another group 
could be the difference in the hours of required household production (see equation 1). For 
example, if people with higher weekly hours of employment also faced higher hours of required 
household production relative to those with lower hours of employment, then the latter would 
also contribute toward a higher incidence of time poverty. In the Korean case, however, this 
does not seem to be the case. As shown in Figure 5, the weekly hours of required household 
production for women and men were roughly stable at 25 and 9 hours, respectively, across the 
intervals of hours of employment.  Longer hours at the job rather than higher housework 
burdens appear to lie behind the positive correlation between hours of employment and time 
poverty rates. On the other hand, the gender disparity in the incidence of time poverty within 
each interval of hours of employment was accompanied by a stark difference in the hours of 
required household production.  
Figure 5 Weekly Hours of Required Household Production, by Weekly Hours of Employment and 
Sex 
 
In the context of our two-dimensional measure, being time-poor can affect the income poverty 
status of the individual and their household. High-income families can “buy out” their time 
deficits, i.e., purchase market substitutes (e.g., restaurant meals and housekeeper services) while 
low-income families may not be able to afford them, at least to the extent that the rich can. The 
monetized value of time deficits can raise the income threshold to an extent that those who are 
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above the official threshold can now appear to be income-poor. For those are already below the 
official poverty line, time deficits can make their income deficit (i.e., the difference between 
poverty line and income) larger. Given the poverty line, the impoverishing effect of time deficits 
depends on the level of household income. For most employed individuals and their families, 
the principal determinant of their income is the level of earnings. Hence, it is also important to 
examine the incidence of time poverty across the earnings distribution.  
Just as there was a marked difference between men and women in time poverty rates within 
intervals of hours at the job, we also found large difference within quintiles of earnings. Time 
poverty among women exceeded men by substantial margins ranging from a difference of 16 
percentage points in the lowest quintile to 37 in the top quintile (Figure 6). The overall time 
poverty rate rises between the first and second quintiles and then decreases gradually over the 
top three quintiles. While there is a declining trend in time poverty from the second to the top 
quintile for men, no such decline is observable for women. This suggests that the gradient of the 
overall time poverty rate with respect to earnings is a reflection of the gender composition of the 
quintiles. At the bottom two rungs of the earnings distribution, the overall time poverty rate and 
the rate for women were quite close because women constituted over 70 percent of all workers 
in these rungs (Figure 7).  The share of women drops sharply in the middle quintile to 50 
percent and continues to decline in the top two quintiles, with the highest quintile containing 
only 21 percent women. 
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Figure 6 Time Poverty Rate by Earnings Quintile and Sex (Percent) 
 
Note: Earnings quintiles were calculated using the data on all employed persons with positive earnings. However, 
time poverty rates and composition of quintiles were calculated using the data on all employed persons. 
Figure 7 Composition of Earnings Quintile by Sex (Percent) 
 
Note: Earnings quintiles were calculated using the data on all employed persons with positive earnings. However, 
time poverty rates and composition of quintiles were calculated using the data on all employed persons. 
The higher time poverty rate of women was accompanied by higher hours of required household 
production. Differences in average hours of employment between men and women do not help 
much in accounting for the sizeable gender difference in the incidence of time poverty within 
each quintile of the earnings distribution. As shown in Figure 8, the average hours of required 
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household production across quintiles fall between 8 and 10 hours for men and between 26 and 
29 hours for women. The average hours of employment were also fairly uniform across the 
quintiles (except for the relatively low values in the bottom quintile): 51 to 52 hours for men and 
47 to 49 hours for women. Clearly, the gap in hours of employment was not sufficient to cover 
the difference in hours of household production.  Hence, employed women carry a greater total 
work burden (household production plus employment) than men in all quintiles, and the extra 
work hours fell between 11 and 15 hours per week. 
Figure 8 Weekly Hours of Employment and Required Household Production, by Sex and Earnings 
Quintile (Average Values) 
 
Key: HP=required hours of household production; EMP=hours of employment 
The potential impact that time deficits may have on the income poverty status of low-income 
earners and their families can be seen by considering the ratio of monetized value of the time 
deficit to earnings, expressed in percentage terms (Figure 9).  In order to escape time poverty, 
the average female worker in the bottom quintile would have to spend almost all (95 percent) of 
her earnings on purchasing market substitutes while her counterpart in the second quintile would 
have to spend about 43 percent. The average male workers in the bottom two quintiles also have 
fairly substantial median values of the value-of-time-deficit-to-earnings ratio, though they are 
not as high as their female counterparts on account of the lower time deficits and higher 
earnings of men. Even for those with “middle-class” earnings (i.e., those in the middle quintile) 
the ratio was as high as 19 percent for men and 27 percent for women. 
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Figure 9 Median Values of the Ratio of Monetized Value of Time Deficit to Earnings, by Sex and 
Earnings Quintile 
 
In sum, time poverty is pervasive among the employed population—42 percent of employed 
persons are time-poor. As we saw, the incidence is higher for women than men irrespective of 
how many hours they are at the job or their position in the earnings distribution. Hours at the job 
do seem to be the principal proximate factor behind the time poverty of men. For women, too, 
hours at the job do matter. Roughly, 95 percent of the employed time-poor were at the job for 35 
hours or more (Figure 9).  However, the higher vulnerability of women that spent similar 
number of hours on the job as men was due to the higher hours of required household 
production. Nearly half of the employed time-poor belong to the bottom two quintiles of the 
earnings distribution. Further, the monetized value of their time deficits formed a substantial 
percentage of their earnings. Both these factors are suggestive of the potential impoverishing 
effects that time deficits may have on low earners and their families.  
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Figure 10 Composition of the Time-poor by Weekly Hours of Employment, Earnings Quintile and 
Sex (Percent) 
 
3.2 Household Structure, Time Poverty and Income Poverty 
We now shift the focus from the individual to the household. Because time deficits are observed 
only among the employed, our interest is in “employed” households. We consider a household 
to be an employed household if either the head or spouse or both are employed. Employed 
households made up about 85 percent of all households in our study population.
19
 Certainly, 
employed individuals do live in households where neither the head nor spouse is employed; but, 
such individuals constitute less than 5 percent of the total number of employed persons. Thus, 
omitting them and their households will not affect our results in a notable fashion. 
The link between individual-level and household-level poverty is complex. For example, 
suppose that the entire employed population consists only of a time-nonpoor man and a time-
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It may be recalled that our study population consists of individuals between the ages of 18 and 70 years of age 
and their households. Our definition of employed households is based on applying the same age restriction to heads 
and spouses. 
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poor woman. If they lived together in a household then the time poverty rate of households will 
be 100 percent; but, if they lived in separate households the rate will be 50 percent. More 
generally, because employed women are much more prone to time poverty than men, the 
household time poverty rate would depend on the proportions of dual-earner households and 
single female-earner households relative to the male-only-earner (traditional “male-
breadwinner”) type of households. We employed the following typology of employed 
households to identify the effects of household structure: 
Table 6 Household Structure, Rates of Time Poverty and Composition of Time-poor Households 
by Household Type (Percent) 
Type of household 
All 
households 
Time-
poor 
Share 
of 
Time-
poor 
Married
20
 
  
  
Male head with nonemployed spouse 35 34 21 
Employed head and spouse 39 78 52 
Nonemployed male head with employed spouse 5 57 5 
Single 
   Male 10 60 11 
Female 10 58 10 
All 100 58 100 
Note: Column 1 shows the share of each type of household in the total number of employed households (i.e., 
households in which either the head or spouse or both are employed); the rate of time poverty is shown in the 
middle column; and, the share of each type of household in the total number of employed, time-poor households is 
shown in the last column. 
The most preponderant type of household (39 percent) was the “dual-earner” household in 
which both the head and spouse are employed, followed by the “male-breadwinner” type (35 
percent).
21
 About 20 percent of all employed households were headed by unmarried persons, of 
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 We considered the head to be married if they had a spouse in the same household. Among the married-couple 
households, there was an additional group consisting of households with a female employed head and nonemployed 
spouse. Because of their very small size, we left them out of the analysis. 
21
 It should be noted that our definitions do not preclude the possibility of the presence of earners other than the 
head and spouse. Thus, for example, our definition of the “male-breadwinner” household may also include a 
household that has an adult daughter of the head who is an earner. In fact, about 16 percent of the male-
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which half were women and half men.  A clear majority of the single-headed households 
consisted of single-person households (58 and 56 percent, respectively, for male and female 
heads). Households headed by a nonemployed male and including an employed spouse—
“female-breadwinner” families constituted a small proportion of all households (about 5 
percent).
22
 
The time-poverty rate was the highest for dual-earner households (78 percent), followed by 
single-headed households and female-breadwinner families (around 60 percent). The incidence 
was substantially lower for male-breadwinner households (33 percent). As we noted earlier, 
time poverty was practically nonexistent among the nonemployed in Korea and among the 
employed the incidence of time poverty was much higher for women than men. Both these 
factors account for the substantially lower degree of time poverty among male-breadwinner 
households than among dual earners. On the other hand, the rate is similar for single-male and 
single-female headed households because heads in both types of households can be expected to 
shoulder the lion’s share of household production, in addition to being the sole earner.  
The division of required household production tasks within the household plays a crucial role in 
determining the differential incidence of time poverty status across the types of households. To 
see this clearly, let us first consider the difference in time poverty rates among male heads in the 
three types of households: male-breadwinner, dual-earner, and single (Figure 11). The average 
hours of employment were virtually identical for the three groups at about 50 hours per week. 
As we would expect, because of the larger average household size, the household-level 
requirements of household production (shown in the figure by bars labelled “HH-total”) were 
higher for married-couple households than single-headed households. But, the requirements 
falling upon single heads were, on average, much greater than their married counterparts 
because the latter were able to have their wives bear the bulk of the requirements. Hence, the 
rate of time poverty for married heads was substantially lower than that of single male heads (30 
versus 57 percent, approximately). 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
breadwinner and dual-earner households included households with earners other than the head or spouse. The 
proportion was somewhat higher for single-headed households. 
22
 The impact of the presence of children on household time and income poverty is discussed separately in section 
3.2.2. 
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Figure 11 Time Poverty Rate of Male Employed Heads and Household Production Requirements 
by Type of Household (Persons 18 to 70 Years of Age) 
 
 
Note: (1) Married sole earner head is the head of a married-couple household where only the male head is 
employed; (2) Dual earner head refers to the head of a married-couple household where only the male head and his 
wife are employed; and (3) Single head is the head of single male-headed household where only the head is 
employed. These definitions represent more stringent criteria than those employed in the typology of Table 4. See 
also Note 21. 
The flipside of the lower requirements of household production encountered by the male heads 
in married-couple households is the higher requirements faced by their wives. Strikingly, the 
average hours of required household production were almost the same for nonemployed wives 
in male-breadwinner families and employed wives in dual-earner families (Figure 12). Since the 
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household-total hours of required household production were identical across the two types of 
families, this outcome can be considered as a reflection of the “double shift” that Korean 
working wives have to contend with. The average hours of household production for single 
female heads were lower compared to wives in the other two groups as a result of the lower 
household-level requirements.  
Figure 12 Hours of Required Household Production of Women (18 to 70 Years Old) by Type of 
Household 
 
Note: (1) “Single, employed head” is the head of single female-headed households where only the head is 
employed; (2) “Dual-earner wife” refers to the wife in a married-couple household where only the male head and 
his wife are employed; (3) “Nonemployed wife, employed husband” refers to the wife in a married-couple 
household where only the husband/head is employed; and (4) These definitions represent more stringent criteria 
than that employed in the typology of Table 4. See also Note 21. 
In fact, the lower hours of required household production of the female breadwinners was 
responsible for their lower rate of time poverty compared to wives in dual-earner households 
(Figure 13) because, on average, both had similar weekly hours of employment (43 hours). 
Similarly, the time poverty rate among employed wives in dual-earner households was higher 
than employed single female heads mainly because the wives had greater hours of required 
household production than single heads, reflecting the smaller average household size among 
the latter.
23
 It does not appear that the difference in the average hours of employment between the 
                                                          
23
 We have chosen to discuss household time poverty in relation to the time poverty of the head and spouse of the 
household here because the overwhelming proportion of households in the sample are time-poor because either the 
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two groups (43 hours for wives compared to 46 hours for single heads) can account for a large 
chunk of the difference of 17 percentage points in the time poverty rate. 
Figure 13 Time Poverty Rates of Employed Single Female Heads and Wives in Dual-Earner 
Families (18 to 70 Years, Percent) 
 
The pattern of incidence of time poverty and the lower average earnings of women we have 
described so far would, other things being equal, lead us to expect that the impoverishing effects 
of time deficits would be higher among dual-earner and female-headed households. This was 
indeed the case (Table 5). Once time deficits were taken into account, a substantial group of 
hidden poor (i.e., those considered as nonpoor by the official measure but poor by LIMTIP) 
becomes visible. Our estimates of the size of the hidden poor suggest that ignoring time deficits 
in household production resulted in a serious undercount of the poor among all types of 
households. Overall, the number of employed poor households increased nearly three-fold when 
time deficits were taken into account. The hidden poverty rate—the difference between the 
LIMTIP and official rate—was notably higher for “nonemployed male head with employed 
spouse,” single female-headed, and dual-earner households. On the other hand, it was lowest 
among the male-breadwinner families while the hidden poverty rate of another type of male-
                                                                                                                                                                                         
head or spouse is time-poor. Households that were designated as time-poor because a member other than the head 
or spouse was time-poor constituted only 7 percent of all time-poor households. Time-poor households in which 
neither the head nor spouse were time-poor generally had adult sons or daughters in time poverty. A separate 
analysis of this subgroup of time-poor households is not possible here because of the small sample size. 
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headed household, those headed by a single male, was comparable to the average hidden 
poverty rate among all employed households. 
Table 7 Poverty of Employed Households by Type of Household: Official vs. LIMTIP 
 
Type of household 
Rate (percent) Number (thousands) 
Official LIMTIP 
Hidden 
poor Official LIMTIP 
Hidden 
poor 
Married male head with nonemployed 
spouse 2.1 3.9 1.8 95 179 84 
Employed head and spouse 1.9 7.5 5.6 96 382 286 
Nonemployed male head with employed 
spouse 7.9 21.8 13.9 54 150 96 
Unmarried employed male head 2.3 7.3 5 30 98 68 
Unmarried employed female head 4.7 12.3 7.6 58 154 95 
All 2.6 7.5 4.9 341 980 639 
Note: We have excluded the statistics for the small group of married-couple households headed by an employed 
female and nonemployed spouse, though they are also included in the totals (i.e., in the line labeled “All”). 
Similar increases can also be observed for men, women, and children in employed households. 
The poverty rate of individuals was lower than that of households because, on average, poor 
employed households had fewer members than nonpoor households. Children had a higher 
poverty rate compared to that of adults because families with children had a higher poverty rate 
than all households (see below). 
Table 8 Poverty of Individuals in Employed Households: Official vs. LIMTIP 
  Rate (Percent) Number (Thousands) 
  Official LIMTIP 
Hidden 
Poor Official LIMTIP 
Hidden 
Poor 
Men 2.3 6.8 4.5 360 1,067 707 
Women 2.5 6.8 4.3 394 1,052 657 
Children 2.6 7.1 4.5 255 698 443 
All 2.5 6.9 4.4 1,010 2,817 1,807 
Note: Children refer to persons less than 18 years old. Men and women include persons 18 to 70 years old. 
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The hidden poverty rate of households depends on the proportion of households that are 
officially classified as income-nonpoor but face some level of time deficits in the total number 
of households. If there were no time-poor households among the officially income-nonpoor, the 
official and LIMTIP poverty rates would be identical. The difference between the official and 
the LIMTIP rates is also a function of the proportion of households with income below the 
LIMTIP threshold in the total number of time-poor households that are officially classified as 
income-nonpoor. Clearly, if everyone in the latter group (time-poor and officially income-
nonpoor) had high enough income to compensate for the monetized value of their time deficits, 
then the official and LIMTIP poverty rates would be identical.
24
 
Our estimates showed that the majority of all employed households (56 percent) were time-poor 
and officially income-nonpoor (Table 7). This was also true of all types of households with the 
exception of male-breadwinner households in which the share was about one-third (34 percent). 
Dual-earner and households with a nonemployed head and an employed wife had the highest 
proportion (a little over three quarters) of time-poor and officially income-nonpoor households. 
But, the difference in the average number of earners per household between the two types of 
households (as well as other factors) resulted, for the dual-earners, in a higher percentage of 
households with income below the LIMTIP poverty line in the total number of time-poor, dual-
earner households that are officially classified as income-nonpoor.  As a result, the hidden 
poverty rate of dual-earners was higher than households with a nonemployed head and 
employed wife. A similar explanation also lies behind why the hidden poverty rate of single 
female-headed households was higher than that of single female-headed households. 
 
                                                          
24
 Let   be the total number of households,   the total number of “hidden-poor” households and   the total number 
of officially income-nonpoor households that are time-poor. Further, let   and    represent, respectively, the 
official and LIMTIP income poverty rates. Then:         ⁄     ⁄  . 
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Table 9 Factors Affecting the Hidden Poverty Rate (LIMTIP Minus Official Poverty Rate) of 
Employed Households (Percent), by Household Type 
Type of Household 
Time-poor and 
Officially Income-
nonpoor Households / 
All Households 
Hidden-poor / Time-
poor and Officially 
Income-nonpoor 
Households 
Hidden Poverty 
Rate 
Married male head with 
nonemployed spouse 33.5 5.4 1.8 
Employed head and spouse 76.7 7.3 5.6 
Nonemployed male head with 
employed spouse 54.0 25.8 13.9 
Unmarried employed male 
head 58.7 8.6 5.0 
Unmarried employed female 
head 55.5 13.7 7.6 
All 56.4 8.6 4.9 
Taking time deficits into account affects not only the measured rate of income poverty (as we 
saw above in our discussion of the hidden poor) but also the depth and severity of income 
poverty.  In other words, a different picture emerges regarding the unmet income needs of the 
poor.  For the officially income-poor households with time deficits, the addition of the 
monetized value of time deficit to their poverty line increases their income deficit (the 
difference between the poverty line and income). This has the effect of increasing the average 
income deficit of all poor households under the LIMTIP definition relative to the official 
definition. The average deficit is also affected by the addition of the hidden-poor, though its 
effect on the overall average deficit is hard to predict a priori. Needless to say, the officially 
income-poor households without time deficits would experience no change in their deficit 
because their poverty lines are not affected by the monetization of time deficits. The average 
deficit of all poor households would thus be the weighted average of the average deficits of the 
three groups, where the weights are their respective shares in the income-poor population. 
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Table 10 The Composition of the Income-poor and Average Monthly Income Deficit (in ₩10,000 
and as a Percentage of the Poverty Line) by Type of Household 
Type of household 
Official LIMTIP 
Share 
(Percent) 
Deficit 
Share 
(Percent) 
Deficit 
Amount Percent Amount Percent 
Married male head with nonemployed 
spouse             
Income-poor, time-nonpoor 66 34.5 30 35 34.5 30 
Officially-poor, time-poor 34 38.0 31 18 61.1 42 
Hidden income-poor       47 35.7 17 
All income-poor 100 35.7 30 100 39.8 24 
Employed head and spouse             
Income-poor, time-nonpoor 50 20.0 17 13 20.0 17 
Officially-poor, time-poor 50 26.2 24 12 59.5 42 
Hidden income-poor       75 57.6 22 
All income-poor 100 23.1 21 100 53.1 23 
Nonemployed male head with employed 
spouse             
Income-poor, time-nonpoor 62 16.0 14 22 16.0 14 
Officially-poor, time-poor 38 36.5 33 14 81.4 52 
Hidden income-poor       64 40.0 21 
All income-poor 100 23.7 21 100 40.2 24 
Unmarried employed male head             
Income-poor, time-nonpoor 61 9.8 11 19 9.8 11 
Officially-poor, time-poor 39 17.6 26 12 76.0 57 
Hidden income-poor       69 24.3 15 
All income-poor 100 12.9 16 100 28.0 19 
Unmarried employed female head             
Income-poor, time-nonpoor 55 12.4 14 21 12.4 14 
Officially-poor, time-poor 45 22.3 22 17 64.1 44 
Hidden income-poor       62 35.5 22 
All income-poor 100 16.9 18 100 35.6 24 
All income-poor             
Income-poor, time-nonpoor 58 21.8 20 20 21.8 20 
Officially-poor, time-poor 42 28.4 27 15 66.4 45 
Hidden income-poor       65 44.9 21 
All income-poor 100 24.6 23 100 43.4 23 
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Our estimates showed that the average monthly LIMTIP income deficit for all poor households 
was 1.8 times higher than the official income deficit—₩434,000 compared to ₩246,000 (Table 
8). The discrepancy between the two measures was the highest for dual-earner families and 
lowest for male-breadwinner families (Figure 14). This is a reflection of the much greater 
incidence of time poverty among the former group compared to the latter. The time-poor (the 
sum of “officially poor,” “time poor” and “hidden poor”) made up 88 percent of all LIMTIP 
income-poor dual-earner families and 63 percent of income-poor male-breadwinner families.  
Figure 14 Ratio of LIMTIP Income Deficit to Official Income Deficit, Employed Households by 
Type of Household 
 
Thus, the official measure grossly understates the unmet income needs of the poor population in 
Korea. From a practical standpoint, this suggests that taking time deficits into account while 
formulating poverty alleviation programs will alter the focus of both the coverage (including the 
“hidden poor” in the target population) and the benefit levels (including the time-adjusted 
income deficits where appropriate).  As expected, the sharp increase in the deficits of the 
officially poor, time-poor households contributed to the wedge between the LIMTIP and official 
deficit. The LIMTIP deficit of this group was 2.5 times higher than the official deficit for all 
employed households; among household types, the discrepancy was the lowest for male-
breadwinner families and higher among the dual-earner and single-headed households. They 
were also quite large in terms of their share in the officially income-poor population. Overall, 
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among employed households, 43 percent of the officially poor households also suffered from 
time poverty, while among dual-earner households they constituted the majority at 52 percent; 
the share among other types of households fell between these two values. Overall and for each 
type of household, the addition of the hidden poor to the ranks of the income-poor appears to 
have contributed to the widening of the LIMTIP deficit relative to the official deficit because the 
average deficit of the hidden poor was higher than the official deficit of the time-poor and time-
nonpoor households. 
3.2.1 The LIMTIP Classification of Households 
We now turn to the joint distribution of time and income poverty status among employed 
households. Overall, given the income poverty rate that we reported above (7.5 percent), the 
interesting question is about the incidence of time poverty. The largest segment (about half of 
all households) were income-nonpoor but time-poor, followed by the group that faced neither 
time nor income poverty (41 percent). At the other extreme, households that encountered both 
income and time deficits constituted 6 percent of all households. The incidence of time deficits 
was higher among the income-poor than the income-nonpoor households by a huge margin (80 
versus 56 percent), thus dispelling the notion held in some quarters that the “working rich” 
professional individuals are more prone to time poverty than the working poor. Since other 
types of social and economic disadvantages tend to accompany income poverty, it is quite likely 
that the negative effects of time poverty will affect the income-poor disproportionately 
compared to the income-nonpoor. We found that the income-poor within each of the household 
types that we considered in our analysis were more susceptible to time poverty than the income-
nonpoor by a considerable degree, with the sole exception of dual-earner families where the gap 
was still 11 percentage points.  
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Table 11 LIMTIP Classification of Employed Households and Incidence of Time Poverty Among 
Employed Households (Percent) 
Type of Household 
LIMTIP Classification Time Poverty Rate 
Income 
and 
Time-
poor 
Income-poor 
and Time-
nonpoor 
Income-
nonpoor and 
Time-poor 
Income-
nonpoor and 
Time-nonpoor 
Income-
poor 
Income-
nonpoor 
Married male head with 
nonemployed spouse 3 1 32 64 65 33 
Employed head and 
spouse 7 1 71 21 87 77 
Nonemployed male 
head with employed 
spouse 17 5 40 38 78 51 
Unmarried employed 
male head 6 1 54 39 81 58 
Unmarried employed 
female head 10 3 48 40 79 55 
All 6 2 52 41 80 56 
Note: “Employed household” is a household in which the head, spouse, or both are employed. We have excluded 
the relatively small subgroup of female employed heads with nonemployed spouses from our analysis here. 
The highest incidence of both time and income poverty (17 percent) was found among female-
breadwinner families (nonemployed male head with an employed female spouse), followed by 
single heads (10 percent) and the dual-earner households (7 percent). In light of their high rates 
of time poverty it is not surprising that dual-earner couples had the lowest proportion of 
households that had neither income nor time deficits. In contrast, the low rates of time poverty 
as well as income poverty enabled the male-breadwinner families to emerge with the highest 
proportion of households that did not face income or time deficits. As we discussed before, the 
difference in the time poverty rates between the dual-earner and male-breadwinner households 
is almost entirely due to the time poverty faced by employed wives in the former group. 
3.2.2 The Impact of Childcare Subsidies and Expenditures on Time and Income Poverty 
Households with young children (defined as persons not older than 6 years) constitute 22 
percent of all employed households. Our accounting of time and income poverty takes into 
account free childcare (i.e., childcare provided via noncash government transfer) and purchased 
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childcare obtained by households with young children.
25
 Both free and purchased hours of 
childcare can relieve the time deficits that the individual may face, though the magnitude of the 
relief can vary across the individuals in the household. This would also translate into a reduction 
in the household-level time deficit that would have existed without outsourcing of childcare. 
Roughly 75 percent of all households with young children outsourced childcare (Figure 15), 
with about the same number of them relying on only purchased childcare services and on a 
combination of purchased and subsidized childcare. In the remainder of this section, we focus 
on those households that outsource childcare.  
Figure 15 Type of Childcare Arrangements by Employed Households with Young Children 
(Percent) 
 
The incidence of time poverty among employed persons in households with young children that 
outsourced childcare declined markedly when we accounted for childcare outsourcing (Figure 
16).  For men and women combined, the time poverty rate declined from 54 to 29 percent; for 
women, the decline was from 78 to 37 percent; and, for men, the decline was from 43 to 26 
percent. It should be noted that in our framework, in so far as men do contribute to the caring of 
young children, they are also assigned some relief in time deficit based on the share of their 
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 A fuller discussion of childcare outsourcing can be found in our public policy brief (Zacharias, Masterson and 
Kim 2014). 
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contribution to the total time that all household members spent on caring for young children. 
Thus, government spending on providing childcare can benefit both men and women. 
Figure 16 Time Poverty Rates of Employed Persons (18 to 70 Years of Age) in Households with 
Young Children that Outsource Childcare and Other Households (Percent) 
 
In addition to the decline in the incidence of time poverty, childcare outsourcing also reduces 
the time deficits faced by time-poor individuals. The decline is particularly notable for women 
(from a mean value of -24 to -7 hours per week) and, as a result, the gender disparity in the time 
deficit appears to reverse with men having a greater average time deficit. 
Figure 17 Time Deficit of Time-poor Persons with and without Childcare Outsourcing (Average 
Weekly Hours) 
 
Note: The bars “Without childcare” indicate the rates that would have existed if the household did not outsource 
childcare. 
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The reduction in time poverty (both its incidence and the size of the deficits) helps to reduce the 
measured income poverty status of households in our framework because the monetized value 
of time deficits that is added to the poverty line of time-poor households would be lower with 
outsourcing of childcare. On the other hand, we also add to the poverty line of households that 
purchase childcare services, an appropriate amount of childcare expenditures (see pp.12-13 for a 
discussion of this issue). Therefore, the two modifications to the measurement framework to 
account for childcare outsourcing have contradictory effects on income poverty that are hard to 
predict a priori. 
Table 12 LIMTIP Classification of Employed Households with Young Children that Outsource 
Childcare (Percent) 
  
LIMTIP Classification Time Poverty Rate 
Income 
and Time-
poor 
Income-poor and 
Time-nonpoor 
Income-nonpoor 
and Time-poor 
Income-nonpoor 
and Time-
nonpoor 
Income
-poor 
Income-
nonpoor 
Without 
Childcare 5.2 0.7 59.2 34.9 88 63 
With 
Childcare 1.7 1.4 38.0 58.9 55 39 
However, our estimates showed that the income poverty rate for employed households with 
young children that outsourced childcare was lower when we took outsourcing into account (3.1 
versus 5.9 percent).  A comparison of the change in the joint distribution of time and income 
poverty status showed that outsourcing reduces the share of the time-poor households in both 
income-poor and income-nonpoor groups. Nevertheless, the income-poor were still much more 
prone to time poverty than the income-nonpoor. 
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4 LABOR FORCE SIMULATION 
Using our method for accounting for the use of childcare services in the estimation of time and 
income poverty in Korea, we simulate the impact of an unspecified employment promotion 
policy on time and income poverty and on the use of childcare services and public subsidies for 
them. The simulated scenario assumes that every nonemployed but employable adult (including 
those who are currently unpaid family workers) in each income-poor household becomes 
employed in a job that best fits (in a statistical sense) their characteristics (such as age and 
educational attainment). This exercise is best seen as an aggregation of the marginal impact on 
each income-poor household of each nonemployed adult receiving the paid employment they 
are most likely to be able to get given actual labor market conditions. It is not a simulation of a 
full employment economy arrived at through some policy measure, though it is intended to 
suggest what the impact of employment-promotion policies might be on time and income 
poverty. 
This work extends the framework we have developed in prior projects on fiscal policy impacts 
as well as the impact of employment generation policies on time and income poverty on 
previous LIMTIP estimates in Latin America and Turkey. In those prior cases we assigned jobs 
(and so, earnings) to those who were either not employed or working only part time. This 
required us to subsequently re-assign household production hours for all individuals in 
households with job recipients, as the total amount as well as the intrahousehold allocation of 
household production would certainly be affected by the change in employment status of some 
of the members of those households. Our accounting for childcare services in our LIMTIP 
estimates for South Korea presents an additional challenge. 
Given the change in employment status inherent in our labor force simulation, we must also deal 
with changes in the use of childcare services for young children. Because many of the 
nonemployed adults who we will give jobs in the simulation spend time caring for young 
children in the household it is reasonable to assume that the use of external childcare services in 
those households with job recipients will change, almost certainly increasing. Thus changes in 
employment status will affect the time and income poverty of individuals and households in a 
number of ways. The first and most obvious way is the additional earnings brought in by the job 
47 
 
recipient(s), which will tend to reduce the income poverty of a household. This increase in 
income may or may not reduce means-tested transfers being received by the household 
(although this impact is one that we do not attempt to estimate in this simulation, meaning the 
results are biased towards poverty reduction). Of course individuals’ time deficits (surpluses) in 
the household, including those who are not job recipients in the simulation, may increase 
(decrease) as the required household production tasks are re-allocated. A given household’s time 
deficit is therefore likely to increase as well. Thus far the analysis is the same as for previous 
work in which we did not account for the use of childcare services. In this case, however, we do 
account for such usage and so changes that will certainly result in their usage as a result of the 
change in employment status of young children’s care-givers must be accounted for as well. An 
increase in the usage of childcare services will effectively reduce the increase in household 
members’ time deficits as a result of more members spending time in paid employment, which 
means that both household time deficits and the poverty line adjustment will be smaller than 
they would be without the use of childcare services. Whether the balance of these impacts on 
time deficits and household income lifts households out of income and/or time poverty is not 
knowable a priori. The simulation we now describe will give us some indication of what we 
might expect, however. 
Previously, we produced labor force simulations by assigning jobs, earnings, and usual work 
hours in one matching step and then reassigning household production hours for individuals in a 
second subsequent step, using the results of the first step. Here we add a third step, re-assigning 
both total household childcare services contracted, as well as total household production and 
care for young children. While the previous two assignments were at the individual level, this 
assignment occurs at the household level. Once this assignment is made, we distribute the total 
hours of household production and care for young children based on the shares calculated from 
the assignment to individuals in the household in the second assignment. Thus we have a full 
complement of re-assigned variables (income, time use, and childcare services) as a result of the 
labor force simulation with which to recalculate the LIMTIP. A more detailed description of the 
methodology employed in the simulation as well as the quality of the results can be found in the 
appendix. 
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By definition the composition of the donor and recipient pools for all three stages of the labor 
force simulation will be very different (refer to the appendix section on simulations for details of 
the recipient and donor pools for each stage). The most obvious difference in the first stage, in 
which the nonemployed are assigned jobs and earnings, is of course the fact the donors are 
employed and the recipients are not. Secondly, because we limit the recipient pool to those 
eligible adults without jobs who are in households below the LIMTIP income poverty line, there 
are relatively few recipients compared to donors, who are all of the employed (see Table 13, 
below). But underlying characteristics that are related to differing employment status are also 
systematically very different. The greatest difference between pools is by sex. Among recipients 
in the employment simulation, 57 percent are female, while only 39 percent of the donor pool is 
female. While among males the distribution by age is quite similar in the recipient and donor 
pools, only 24 percent of females in the recipient pool are under 35 years of age, while 44 
percent of those in the donor pool are. The simulation is done by assigning jobs and earnings in 
a hot-decking process within cells constructed from sex, age, and educational achievement 
categories. Thus, although the pools are dissimilar along these axes, the matches we find for our 
recipients are not dissimilar in these characteristics. Because the recipient pool is entirely drawn 
from the households that are income-poor, and the donor pool is not restricted in this way, 
earnings and income are the greatest differences between the recipient and donor pools. 
Table 13 Recipient and Donor Pools for Individuals by Sex 
  
Jobs and Earnings 
Assignment Time Use Assignment 
Recipients Donors Recipients Donors 
Male 
        
272,438  
   
10,823,723  
        
727,591  
   
10,203,063  
Female 
        
364,219  
     
6,975,762  
        
611,101  
   
10,230,741  
Total 
        
636,657  
   
17,799,485  
    
1,338,692  
   
20,433,804  
Male 43.1% 60.8% 54.6% 49.9% 
Female 56.9% 39.2% 45.4% 50.1% 
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In the second stage of the simulation, we re-assign weekly hours of household production, care 
for young children, and commuting time for all adult members of households that contain job 
recipients in the first stage. Again, the pools are very dissimilar. Most obviously, those in the 
donor pool are all adults in households in which all eligible adults are currently employed. 
Again, the donor pool is much larger overall. The difference by sex between the recipient and 
donor pools is less stark in this round: 45 percent female and 50 percent female, respectively. 
Again, the matches are done in cells constructed from age, sex, and educational achievement 
categories, so the matches we make will be similar in these characteristics. In the final stage of 
the simulation, we reassign total household production weekly hours, total time spent caring for 
young children, and total childcare hours outsourced, both privately financed and publically 
subsidized. This stage is done at the household level, and the households in the recipient and 
donor pools are the households containing recipients and donors in the second stage. There are 
very many more households in the donor pool than the recipient pool (see Table 14, below). In 
this stage the matching cells are constructed using the number of children and number of adults 
in the household, ensuring that the matches will be made between structurally similar 
households.  
Table 14 Recipient and Donor Pools for Childcare Assignment 
Childcare Assignment 
Recipients Donors 
567,743 9,329,819 
Once the simulation is complete, we can compare the results to the current situation. Intuitively, 
the simulation cannot have a great impact on the overall time and income poverty situation in 
Korea, since the recipient pool is so small relative to the overall population. We can, however, 
compare the situation of the time- and income-poor before and after the simulation to assess the 
first order impacts of nonemployed adults receiving a job they are likely to get in the labor 
market conditions in Korea in 2008. 
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4.1 Individuals 
First we examine the impact of the simulation on rates of time and income poverty for 
individuals (Table 15, below). The portion of individuals who are income-poor by our measure 
has dropped from 8.2 percent to 6.6 percent overall. This is a substantial decrease, but the 
majority (80.3 percent) of income-poor individuals remain so despite the employment 
simulation. The majority of these hard-core poor individuals (92.6 percent) are in households 
that did not contain a job recipient in the simulation. In other words there are relatively few 
nonemployed adults in income-poor Korean households. Of the 2.7 percent of individuals who 
suffered from time and income poverty, 2.2 percent remained in this position as a result of the 
simulation. The majority of those escaping this situation escaped income poverty, but half of 
those did not escape time poverty (0.2 percent). The smallest portion (0.1 percent) escaped time 
poverty only. Escaping income poverty is no doubt the result of the increased earnings as a 
result of receiving jobs. The removal of individuals’ time deficits is perhaps not an intuitive 
result, but the reallocation of time within households as a result of the change in employment 
status may relieve those with time deficits, as others in the household take up more of the 
burden of required household production. In addition, additional childcare services contracted 
might take up some of the time deficits. Of the 5.5 percent of individuals in income but not time 
poverty before the simulation most (3.9 percentage points or 70 percent of the total) remained in 
that situation. A small portion (0.4 percentage points or 8 percent of the total) dropped into time 
poverty without relief from income poverty, so 4.3 percent of the original 5.5 percent remained 
income-poor. Another small portion (0.4 percentage points or 7 percent) escaped income 
poverty but fell into time poverty as a result. Finally, the largest portion of those with changed 
time or income poverty status (0.8 percentage points or 15 percent of the total) escaped income 
poverty without falling into time poverty. So of the income-poor in 2009, 20 percent escaped 
income poverty as a result of the employment assignment, although 8 percent of those fell into 
time poverty as well. Although there is a substantial reduction in income poverty as a result of 
nonemployed persons receiving employment, even given actual labor market conditions in 
Korea, 6.6 percent of individuals are in income poverty after the simulation, substantially more 
than the actual official income poverty rate of 4.3 percent. We move on to consider the impact 
of the employment simulation on individuals’ time poverty. 
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Table 15 Time and Income Poverty Status of Individuals Before and After Simulation 
LIMTIP classification of 
persons (15 to 70 years), 
adjusted for childcare 
outsourcing 
LIMTIP classification of persons (15 to 70 years), 
adjusted for childcare outsourcing, simulation 
Income-
poor, 
Time-
poor 
Income-
poor, 
Time-
nonpoor 
Income-
nonpoor, 
Time-
poor 
Income-
nonpoor, 
Time-
nonpoor Total 
Income-poor, Time-poor 2.2% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 2.7% 
Income-poor, Time-nonpoor 0.4% 3.9% 0.4% 0.8% 5.5% 
Income-nonpoor, Time-poor     22.3%   22.3% 
Income-nonpoor, Time-
nonpoor       69.5% 69.5% 
Total 2.6% 4.0% 22.9% 70.5% 100.0% 
Looking at the changes in the time poverty status of individuals receiving jobs in the labor force 
simulation, we note that the addition of paid work increases the rate of time poverty to almost 
50 percent from its actual rate of just under 14 percent (Table 16, below). This is reflective of 
the phenomenon mentioned in the previous section of time poverty being restricted mostly to 
employed persons in Korea.
26
 Even with the availability of childcare subsidies, the cost for 
nonworking people in income-poor households of moving into paid employment is a dramatic 
increase in the incidence of time poverty. Although some of the time-poor (35 percent or 4.7 
percent of the total) moved out of time poverty (as discussed above, this transition is due to the 
realignment of household production responsibilities concomitant with the employment changes 
in the recipients’ households) implying that the majority (65 percent) remained time-poor. The 
greater shift was among those who were income-poor and not time-poor, into time poverty. Of 
those individuals, 48 percent (41.1 percent of the total) became time-poor as a result of the 
simulation, an intuitive result of adding paid employment to household production requirements.  
 
 
                                                          
26
 The time poverty rate of individuals receiving jobs is as high as 14 percent because we assign jobs to those who 
are currently unpaid family workers. Such workers are normally classified as employed, and we used the same 
classification in the previous section (Section 3). 
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Table 16 Rates of Time Poverty Among Individuals Receiving Jobs, Before and After Simulation 
Time 
Poverty 
Status 
Time Poverty Status, Simulation 
Not 
Time- 
poor 
Time- 
poor Total 
Not Time- 
poor 45.4% 41.1% 86.5% 
Time-poor 4.7% 8.8% 13.5% 
Total 50.1% 49.9% 100.0% 
Individuals who received jobs in the simulation had much larger time deficits, on average, than 
time-poor individuals in general, before and after the simulation (see Table 17, below). Time 
and income-poor individuals (those who were in the recipient pool of the labor force simulation) 
had an additional 10.7 hours per week time deficit compared to time-poor individuals on 
average, or a 57 percent greater time deficit. The median time deficit was 68 percent greater for 
time- and income-poor individuals. As a result of the simulation, the average time deficit for all 
time-poor individuals increased by just under three hours per week (a change of 15 percent), 
while the median was virtually unchanged. The average time deficit for those who received jobs 
in the simulation was 299 percent (74.8 hours per week) greater than that of all the time-poor. 
Their own time deficits as a group increased by 45.3 hours per week (a 153 percent increase) 
although the median for this group fell by 4.3 hours (or 16 percent). 
Table 17 Time Deficits of Time-Poor Individuals Before and After Simulation 
  
Time Deficit, Adjusted for 
Childcare Outsourcing 
Mean Weekly 
Hours 
Median Weekly 
Hours 
All Time-poor 
Individuals -18.8 -15.7 
All Time- and Income-
poor Individuals -29.5 -26.4 
All Time-poor 
Individuals, Simulation -21.6 -15.8 
All Time-poor 
Individual Simulation 
Job Recipients -74.8 -22.1 
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To sum up, because there were relatively few people who received jobs in the simulation, the 
impact of the simulation on time and income poverty was not very large. However, those 
individuals who received jobs were likely not to escape income poverty, and to become time-
poor, with a greater depth of time poverty than the norm. So although there was a reduction in 
income poverty, there was a much larger increase in time poverty among the target group of the 
simulation. We now examine the impact of the simulation at the level of the household. 
4.2 Households 
We first examine the transition of the households in the adjusted income-poor categories (the 
target population of the simulation). Of the 9.7 percent of households classified as income-poor 
according to our childcare outsourcing adjusted income poverty line, 8.3 percent (or 85 percent 
of income-poor households) remain income-poor despite the simulation (see Table 18, below). 
This is an outgrowth of the fact noted above, that most of the eligible adults in income-poor 
households are already employed, so their status and that of all of the households without 
nonemployed eligible adults will not be changed by the simulation. In fact, 947,000 (62.5 
percent) of the 1.5 million households classified as income-poor under our childcare outsourcing 
adjusted measure had no members in the simulation. Thus, 22.5 percent of income-poor 
households did have a member in the simulation and yet, did not escape income poverty. This is 
due to the limited earning potential of the nonemployed members of income-poor households in 
the actual labor market conditions in Korea, combined with the impact of increased time deficits 
as a result of increased labor market participation in the affected households. Of those 
households who are income- and time-poor according to our measure 15 percent (0.8 percent of 
all households) escaped income poverty, but only 2 percent (0.1 percent of all households) also 
escaped time poverty. Virtually no households that were time- and income-poor escaped time 
poverty, but not income poverty. Of those households that were income-poor but not time-poor 
14 percent (0.6 percent of all households) escaped income poverty. Of those, 8 percent (0.3 
percent of all households) fell into time poverty. Another 14 percent (0.6 percent of all 
households) fell into time poverty without escaping income poverty. 
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Table 18 Household Time and Income Poverty Rates, Before and After Simulation 
Four-way Classification of 
Households According to 
LIMTIP, Adjusted for Childcare 
Outsourcing 
Four-way Classification of Households According to 
LIMTIP, Adjusted for Childcare Outsourcing, 
Simulation 
Income-
poor, 
Time-
poor 
Income-
poor, 
Time-
nonpoor 
Income-
nonpoor, 
Time-
poor 
Income-
nonpoor, 
Time-
nonpoor Total 
Income-poor, Time-poor 4.4% 0.0% 0.7% 0.1% 5.2% 
Income-poor, Time-nonpoor 0.6% 3.2% 0.3% 0.3% 4.5% 
Income-nonpoor, Time-poor     44.1%   44.1% 
Income-nonpoor, Time-nonpoor       46.2% 46.2% 
Total 5.0% 3.3% 45.1% 46.6% 100.0% 
Despite the modest impact of the simulation on time and income poverty rates, we can expect 
that there was substantial change in the time devoted to caring for children and the amount of 
childcare outsourced by Korean households. In fact we see dramatic shifts in the outsourcing of 
childcare among households with young children (see Table 19, below). Comparing households 
with young children that were both income-poor and time-poor in the actual situation to the time 
and income-poor households in the simulation, we see a modestly lower amount of total hours 
per week (0.4 hours or 9  percent) devoted to caring for young children in the latter group. 
However the hours of both privately financed and publically subsidized childcare are much 
larger for this group (24 and 46 hours per week or 49 percent and 150 percent, respectively). 
Comparing the income-poor, time-nonpoor group in the actual situation with the same group in 
the simulation, we see an even larger reduction in the total hours spent caring for young children 
(5.8 hours or 45 percent), combined with a shift from a majority of publically subsidized 
childcare to majority privately financed. This is due to the combined impact of an increase of 85 
hours (over 300 percent) of privately-financed care and a reduction of 40 hours (35 percent) in 
publically-subsidized care. This translates to a larger percentage increase in the total amount of 
privately financed childcare (6.3 percent) than in publically subsidized childcare (0.1 percent). 
Because there is such minimal transition out of income poverty in the simulation, the numbers 
for the two income-nonpoor groups are largely unaffected by the simulation. It is interesting to 
note nonetheless that while, in the actual situation the income-nonpoor households contracted 
more privately financed childcare than income-poor households, whether time-poor or not, in 
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the simulation this is reversed. In fact, income- and time-poor households in the simulation 
contract almost as much childcare in the simulation as income-nonpoor, time-nonpoor 
households. And while income-poor, time-poor households receive slightly fewer subsidized 
hours than income-nonpoor, time-poor households in the actual situation, they receive more 
than twice as many hours in the simulation. There is some circularity inherent in these 
comparisons of course, since the use of outsourced childcare both relieves time deficits within 
households, but also puts greater strain on household finances, to the extent that this use is 
privately financed. So we could just as easily argue that the greater use of outsourced childcare 
results in the household escaping or avoiding time poverty. The dynamics of the reallocation of 
childcare between households and childcare centers clearly demand greater attention, as this 
seems to be the site of the greatest impact due to our employment simulation.  
Table 19 Average Weekly Hours Caring for Young Children and Outsourced Childcare 
  
Actual Simulation 
Total 
Caring 
for 
Young 
Children 
Privately 
Financed 
Childcare 
Publically 
Subsidized 
Childcare 
Total 
Caring 
for 
Young 
Children 
Privately 
Financed 
Childcare 
Publically 
Subsidized 
Childcare 
Income-Poor, Time-Poor 3.3 50.1 30.7 4.3 74.4 76.7 
Income-Poor, Time-
Nonpoor 6.8 28.4 112.5 7.1 114.1 72.9 
Income-Nonpoor, Time-
Poor 8.3 66.4 36.4 8.2 66.1 36.5 
Income-Nonpoor, Time-
Poor 11.3 83.3 59.8 11.3 83.5 59.5 
In sum, we assigned jobs to over 636,000 individuals in 568,000 childcare outsourcing adjusted 
income-poor households in our simulation. We then reassigned household production and 
outsourced childcare hours in those households. Because there are just over 3 million adult 
individuals in those households, our simulation can have and has only a limited impact on time 
and income poverty. However, 658 thousand individuals and 233 thousand households escaped 
income poverty, though many fell into or remained in time poverty. Indeed, time poverty rates 
increased dramatically among individuals in the simulation, and the depth of time deficits 
increased substantially (15 percent overall among time-poor individuals and 153 percent for 
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time-poor job recipients in the simulation). We find similar changes in time and income poverty 
rates at the level of the household as a result of the simulation. Perhaps the most striking impact 
is in the redistribution of childcare outside of the households in the simulation. Income-poor 
households increased their use of outsourced (both privately financed and publically subsidized) 
childcare by about 39 hours per month. 
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5 CONCLUDING REMARKS: SOME POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
Our LIMTIP framework and findings suggest that policies to reduce time-adjusted income 
poverty must address five interdependent domains: (a) labor market outcomes, reflected in hours 
of employment and earnings; (b) demographic structures and household composition as they 
influence the amount of time needed to fulfill household production requirements; (c) levels of 
direct assistance as they modify incomes; (d) provisioning of social services because they 
greatly affect the ability to meet household production requirements; and (e) gender norms 
which are embedded in all of the above mentioned domains. These factors are intertwined and it 
is their combined effect that determines the (time-adjusted) poverty status of individuals and 
households. To effect positive transformation, care must be taken so that changes in one domain 
can work synergistically with the others. If not, there is a danger of trading off one dimension of 
poverty (income) for another (time deficits). 
We find that long hours of market work is the main cause of time deficits and that this 
characteristic of paid work discourages mainly married women with children from maintaining 
their ties to or returning to the labor market. Shorter work hours, whether part-time or full-time 
with fewer hours, are necessary to address the time barrier to work for them. Widespread 
adoption of flexible work schedules may improve women’s employment opportunities. One of 
the underlying causes of income and time poverty, as suggested by our employment simulation, 
is that the employment that nonemployed individuals from income-poor households are likely to 
get will yield low earnings, despite their long working hours. Increasing minimum wage rates to 
account for the costs of market substitutes these workers have to purchase to meet the long 
hours at work can reduce time poverty of the low-skill workers. Skills training, properly 
directed to match local employers’ demands, could also improve the earnings of these workers. 
The employment centers in Korea may need to strengthen career counseling and guidance 
services to customers in their selection of a training program.  
The means-tested childcare voucher program in 2008 is shown to reduce childcare-related time 
burdens. But many recipient households still make private expenditures to supplement the 
vouchers, in part due to facing long hours of work. Our findings suggest that the Won amount of 
the vouchers should increase for low-income households to lower the financial burden 
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employment carries with it. Moreover, ensuring access to extended-hours childcare service to 
double-earner households is imperative to promote mothers’ reentry into the labor market that 
demands long hours of work. Expansion of childcare services is necessary to increase 
employment levels of individuals, especially from low-income households, as our simulation 
results indicate.  
Gender norms entrenched in sharing household production have put pressure on women’s time 
budgets. We observe throughout our results that, despite the fairly extensive childcare program 
that would reduce the time burden of mothers, women still suffer from unequal distribution of 
other responsibilities at home that account for two-thirds of all household production hours. 
Employed female spouses do more of the unpaid work at home, even more than nonemployed 
male heads. It is challenging to modify individual behavior in this private sphere. Increasing the 
economic empowerment of women through equitable wage policies and expanded employment 
opportunities can facilitate movement toward a fairer and more equal sharing of household 
responsibilities, resulting in the reduction of poverty and the improvement of the quality of life 
for all.  
In the following sections, we discuss in detail the implications of our findings in the areas of 
employment, wage, and social policies for achieving the reduction of both income and time 
poverty.  
5.1 Employment  
The Park administration has announced the goal of raising the employment rate to 70 percent of 
the active population. From a gender perspective, the policy goal is specifically to encourage 
women’s employment, since the male employment rate has been above the target rate all along. 
One of the ways to assess the feasibility of reaching the goal is to estimate how many hours a 
woman may be able to work for pay given her household and individual circumstances. The 
probable-hour simulation illustrates the scenario in which formerly nonemployed people take up 
jobs with most likely work hours, rather than ride full-time employment that might be infeasible 
to them given other responsibilities and commitments related to their demographic and 
individual characteristics revealed in the data.  
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The probable-hour simulation highlights the contribution of employment for income-poor, in 
particular income-poor and time-nonpoor, households. Women account for 57 percent of the 
total job recipients, and 64.5 percent of those receiving part-time employment. In particular, 
among married couples with young children, women account for 76 percent of the job 
recipients. Among the female job recipients, occupational distribution mirrors a strong disparity 
of jobs by level of education in the labor market: women with a high school education or less 
tend to be concentrated in the lower end of the occupational ladder (i.e., manual and production 
workers), while women with college educations all receive jobs in the professional occupations 
(i.e., teachers, social workers, and other high-end service jobs) with higher wage earnings. The 
biased occupational distribution applies to men, as well. The occupational segregation by 
education emphasizes the need for skills training programs to improve the outcome of labor 
force participation of the less educated population.  
5.2 Wage 
The employment simulation results show that over 71 percent of the job recipients remain 
income-poor, which is indicative of a low earnings potential among nonemployed adults in low-
income households.  In addition, time deficits and associated challenges will be felt differently 
by levels of earnings. As we have seen, the ratio of monetized value of the time deficit to 
earnings of individuals vary significantly from almost 40 percent for employed women in the 
second quintile to just over 5 percent for men in top earnings quintile.
27
 Though the usual hours 
of work do not differ much across the earnings distribution, the percentage of earnings needed 
to substitute for the time deficit is higher in the lower earnings quintiles. We find that the depth 
of poverty among the job recipient households increases from ₩450,000 to ₩860,000 per 
month as a result of the simulated employment. Long hours of work for low wages are found to 
aggravate their quality of life. These finding indicate that other than public service provisioning 
to alleviate time deficit of the low earning persons, raising the wage rates of at the low end of 
the distribution is to be considered. The higher wage rates would enable the individuals either to 
                                                          
27
 Very low usual hours of work (less than 8 hours a week) are attributable to the low earnings. From the second 
quintile, the usual hours of work of over 40 hours per week do not vary over the earnings distribution.  
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lower their paid work hours or to increase the purchase of market substitutes to make up for the 
time deficit.  
5.3 Service Provision as a Support for Employment 
The hidden poor, those who are time-poor but income-nonpoor in the LIMTIP framework, 
represent the group for which social service support would be effective to relieve their time 
deficit, hence, improve their quality of life. Time poverty is almost entirely confined to the 
employed population. Public provisioning of services that substitute for household production 
can reduce the time poverty of the employed.  
The responsibility of childcare, a strong constraint on mothers’ time use, is one of the areas in 
which public assistance can make a difference for individuals as well as for the public. The 
childcare voucher program reduces the time deficits of most households with young children, 
though the program considered in this study is not as universal as the current program. It is 
especially true for spouses with young children, reducing their time deficits by more than 18 
hours a week on average. It also encourages mothers to maintain their employment or to lower 
the barrier to labor market re-entry, which in turn increases household earnings and lowers 
poverty rates. Thus the sharing of the responsibility for childcare with the public is an effective 
measure to address the quality of life, as represented by the rate of time poverty. Given these 
promising findings, we expect the universal childcare program to improve welfare greatly; the 
more families that receive the benefits, the more women may participate in gainful employment.  
However our findings suggest that the voucher program needs to revamp its support for the low-
income families.  
5.3.1 Enhancing the Program for Low-income Households 
The childcare voucher does not cover the full cost of childcare services. Our findings suggest 
that nearly 40 percent of care services were covered by private expenditure despite the voucher 
program existing among the households with a mixed private and public childcare arrangement. 
Out of pocket expenses of over ₩174,000 per month on average may be a significant burden to 
income-poor families with young children. This financial burden will limit the use of the service 
and hinders nonemployed adults, especially women, in families with young children from 
obtaining more gainful employment. Among households with young children that spend out of 
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pocket for childcare, the time- and income-poor household spent, on average, ₩280,000 per 
month, which is 16 percent of their gross income, while the time- and income-nonpoor spent 
over ₩233,000, 5.9 percent of their gross income. The time-poor and income-nonpoor 
household that most double-earner households belong to spent ₩201,000 per month, 4 percent 
of their gross income on the childcare service. The unequal burden of the additional costs 
associated with the childcare service highlights the need to bolster the support for the low-
income households. The maximum amount of the current universal childcare voucher, though 
expanding coverage, offers a flat rate of support without increasing the amount of support for 
the low-income households. Incremental rates that favored low-income families would enhance, 
at least partially, the policy’s effectiveness. A program that targeted low-income households and 
provided more resources for additional children is one modification that could increase the 
positive impact of the voucher program. Although the vouchers contributed substantially 
towards the purchasing of childcare services, income- and time-poor households with young 
children, on average, still spent over ₩276,000 per month, or 16 percent of their own income, 
compared to about 4 percent for the income-nonpoor, and time-poor households with young 
children. As the current level of support alone fails to lift time- and income-poor households out 
of the double poverty status, this modification would strengthen the support for this household 
group.  
5.4  Direct Income Assistance 
Our findings suggest that employment alone is not able to lift all households out of poverty. Our 
simulation results suggest that employment generation alone will have, at best, mixed success. 
Over 73 percent of income-poor job recipients move out of income poverty, but 60 and 30 
percent of income- and time-poor and income-poor and time-nonpoor individuals experience 
increased time deficits as a result of receiving employment. What is more concerning is that 
over 28 percent of the income-poor individuals remain income-poor even with employment. 
These individuals are likely to work in the manufacturing, hotel and restaurant, and personal 
service sectors as manual or production workers: jobs that pay low wages. Therefore, 
employment promotion itself will not be enough to lift them out of poverty, especially when the 
monetized value of their increased time deficits is taken into account. Direct transfers (cash or 
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in-kind) and/or bolstering earned income tax credit to indirectly subsidize their earnings need to 
be supplemented for low-income workers.  
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APPENDIX A: STATISTICAL MATCHING AND MICROSIMULATION 
This appendix describes the construction of synthetic datasets created for use in estimation of 
the Levy Institute Measure of Time and Income Poverty (LIMTIP) for South Korea in 2009.
28
 
This work was carried out for a project contracted by the Korean Employment Information 
Service (KEIS).
29
 Construction of the LIMTIP estimates requires a variety of information for 
households. In addition to basic demographics, the estimation process requires information 
about income and time use. No single data set has all the required data for South Korea. Thus, in 
order to produce LIMTIP estimates, a synthetic data file is created by statistically matching two 
source data sets.
30
 We use the Korean Welfare Panel Study (KWPS 2009), the unification of 
“the near-poor and the poor panel, self-support panel” by the Korean Institute for Health and 
Social Affairs and the “Korean welfare panel” by the Social Welfare Research Center of Seoul 
National University as the base data set, since it contains good information on demographics, 
income, transfers and taxes for a representative sample of households in South Korea. Time use 
data comes from the Korean Time Use Survey (KTUS 2009), which is also nationally 
representative.  
In order to assess the possible impact of income-poverty reduction strategies founded upon 
expanding employment on time and income poverty, it is necessary to impute the impact of 
those strategies on the income, time allocation, and childcare utilization of households. We draw 
on and extend our work simulating the results of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(Zacharias, Masterson, and Kim 2009) and previous LIMTIP employment simulations 
(Masterson 2012, 2013). In this case, we assume that some unspecified way is found to employ 
those adults in households below our adjusted income poverty line who are not employed. We 
then assess the impact this change has on time and income poverty. 
This appendix is organized as follows. The source datasets are described and their demographic 
characteristics are compared. Then the quality of the statistical match is reviewed including 
                                                          
28
 For a description of the theory and methodology behind producing estimates of the Levy Institute Measure of 
Time and Income Poverty (LIMTIP) see Zacharias (2011). 
29
 The project, titled “Employment and Social Policies for Time and Income Poor: Application of LIMTIP in South 
Korea” is managed by Tae-Hee Kwon of KEIS with co-investigators Ajit Zacharias, Rania Antonopoulos, Thomas 
Masterson and Kijong Kim of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College. 
30
 See Kum and Masterson (2010) for details of the statistical matching procedure that we use.  
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diagnostics about the match itself. Next we describe the methodology involved in the imputation 
of occupation, industry, and employment type, hours of employment and earnings, household 
income, household production hours, and childcare hours. Finally, we assess the results of the 
simulation. 
Statistical Matching 
Data and Alignment 
The source data sets for the time use match for the LIMTIP estimates for South Korea are the 
2009 KWPS and the 2009 KTUS. We use individual records from the 2009 KWPS file, 
excluding those living in group quarters or in the Armed Forces. Since the KTUS covers 
individuals aged 10 years old and over, we discard younger individuals from the KWPS file. 
This leaves 14,502 records, which represents 43,219,236 individuals when weighted. In the 
KTUS, we have 20,263 individual records, representing 43,297,959 individuals when weighted. 
In order to create the estimates of the time-income poverty measure, we had to construct 
thresholds for the time spent on household production. The thresholds are defined for the 
household. The reference group in constructing the thresholds consists of households with at 
least one nonemployed adult and income around the official income poverty line. We divided 
the reference group into 12 subgroups based on the number of children (0, 1, 2 and 3 or more) 
and number of adults (1, 2 and 3 or more) for calculating the thresholds. The thresholds are 
simply the average values of the time spent on household production by households, 
differentiated by the number of adults and children. In principle, they represent the average 
amount of household production that is required to subsist at the poverty-level of income. 
For practical purposes, we defined the reference group as households with household incomes 
between 75 percent and 150 percent of the poverty line (this range is referred to as the poverty 
band hereafter), and with at least one nonemployed adult. In order to transfer the hours spent by 
individuals on household production in the reference group as closely as possible, we used the 
following strata variables in the match: indicators for being within the poverty band, for having 
one or more nonemployed adults in the household, the number of children, the number of adults, 
sex, employment status, and household income category.  
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Estimation of the poverty band in the time use micro data 
In order to do the time use match required for the estimation of the LIMTIP for Korea, we need 
to be able to identify the individuals from households within the poverty band. This variable can 
be directly calculated in the KWPS, but because the KTUS data has limited income variables 
(only categorical personal income), we have to impute a household's presence in the poverty 
band in the time use data. We do this by using the predicted probability of being within the 
poverty band by means of a probit estimation. 
We begin by constructing a household income measure for households in the time use data. For 
each individual, we create a personal income variable using the midpoint of the categories of the 
existing personal income variable, and replacing the top category (over ₩5,000,000) with 
₩6,000,000. The household income is then created by summing these across all members of the 
household. This results in a household income distribution in the time use data that has a 
substantially lower mean than that in the welfare data (₩2.6 million versus ₩3.5 million). We 
normalize the household income data in the welfare and time use data separately, in order to 
produce similar distributions for the probit estimation and prediction. 
We then proceed to run probit estimations on each of the reference group categories for the 
required household production (12 combinations of number of adults, one to three or more, and 
number of children, zero to three or more, in the household) in the KWPS. The dependent 
variable is an indicator of presence in the poverty band and the independent variables are 
standardized household income, number of persons in the household, a set of dummies for seven 
regions of the country, the sex of the household head, the age and square of age of the 
household head, dummies for family type, dummies for tenure status, dummies for the type of 
housing unit, the number of earners in the household, and the level of education of the 
household head. The results of the estimation are used to predict the presence of the household 
in the poverty band for all household records in both the time use and the welfare data. We 
estimate the latter in order to assess the quality of the procedure. The results for the procedure 
are presented in Table 1. As we can see, the rate of misprediction is quite low, at 8.5 percent. In 
addition, the highest income of those households in the welfare data that were miscategorized as 
being within the poverty band was ₩3.5 million, which is not too far above the maximum 
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poverty line for welfare data of ₩2.2 million. This gives us confidence in our estimates, and the 
matching can proceed. 
Alignment of the time use and welfare panel surveys 
Table 2 compares the distribution of individuals by these variables in the two data sets. Since 
both surveys were carried out over roughly the same time period, we would expect them to be 
well aligned. Unfortunately that seems not to be the case. We see that there are 3 percent fewer 
individuals in households without children in the KWPS than in the KTUS, while individuals in 
two children households make up a greater share of those in the income and expenditure survey. 
Individuals in one-adult and two-adult households are more common in the KTUS and those in 
three-or-more-adult households are more common in the KWPS, a difference of five percentage 
points. The ratio of individuals in households with at least one nonemployed adult differs by 7 
percent between the two surveys, while the ratio of individuals in households within the poverty 
band is 4 percent higher in the KTUS. The distribution by household income is noticeably more 
skewed to the lower end of the distribution in the KTUS compared to the KWPS. The portion of 
households in the lowest income category is six percentage points higher in the KTUS while the 
share in the highest income category is eight percentage points lower. This is due to the poor 
quality of the household income question and data in the time use survey. The nonemployed are 
under-represented in the KTUS relative to the KWPS (3 percent). The distribution of individuals 
by sex, at least, is close in the two surveys, with less than one half a percent separating the share 
of women in the KTUS and the KWPS. So, we have a relatively bad alignment between the two 
surveys compared to other statistical matches we have done. 
Match QC 
Turning to the results of the match, we first look to the distribution of matched records by 
matching round in Table 3. The bulk of the matches, 69.5 percent, occur in the first round. This 
is lower than in other time use matches (see, for example, Masterson 2010), due to the higher-
than-usual number of strata variables used in this match, and their relative misalignment.
31
 The 
rest of the records are matched over an additional 16 rounds, with 1.7 percent receiving no 
match at all (Round 18). Table 4 provides a comparison of the distribution of weekly hours of 
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 In a typical time use match (as in Masterson 2010), five variables are used, yielding a total of 32 matching cells. 
In this match, using seven strata variables, the number of matching cells in the first round was 170. 
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household production in the KTUS and the matched file. The tenth percentile is zero, so two of 
the percentile ratios are undefined. The remaining percentile ratios are all relatively close, with 
the ratio of the 75
th
 percentile to the median being exactly equivalent. The Gini coefficient is 
quite close, 0.625 in the matched file, compared to 0.627 in the KTUS. Table 5 breaks down the 
mean and median of the three categories of household production and the total in the matched 
file and the KTUS.
32
 We can see that for all four variables the difference in the matched and the 
source file’s mean is very small, with the largest proportional difference, in procurement, being 
2.8 percent, but amounting to less than two minutes lower in the matched file than in the KTUS. 
The total is off by less than one percent, amounting to about eight and one half minutes. Median 
core and total household production is exactly equal in the matched file. 
Examination of the quality of the match within population sub-groups shows generally good 
results. Figure 1 displays ratios of mean weekly hours of household production between the 
matched file and the KTUS for the seven strata variables. For almost all the categories, the 
average weekly hours in the matched file are within 5 percent of the KTUS. One exception is 
for males, who have 9 percent higher weekly hours in the matched file, although this amounts to 
a difference of only one half hour. The other is for individuals in households with at least one 
nonemployed adult, who have about 7 percent lower weekly hours in the matched file. This 
amounted to a bit over one fewer hour per week. Overall the ratios of the mean weekly 
household production hours in the matched file to those in the KTUS by the strata variables 
were quite close to one. 
Table 6 has the actual numbers, and we can see that the large percentage differences represent 
relatively small differences in hours per week. For example, the largest percentage gap among 
income categories— in the middle income category—we see that the actual amount of time 
difference is about 45 minutes per week. Notice also that the ratios by category are well-
reproduced in the matched file. The largest deviation is by presence of nonemployed adult in the 
household, as we would expect given the misalignment of this variable between the two 
surveys. The extent to which the match file reproduces the distribution of weekly hours of 
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 The three categories are care (childcare, eldercare, etc.), procurement (shopping, etc.), and core (cooking, 
cleaning, laundry, etc.).  
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household production within reference groups is demonstrated in Figure 2 and Table 7.
33
 We 
can see very little difference between the matched file and the KTUS in the distribution of 
weekly hours for individuals in Figure 2. Table 7 shows the ratio of household total hours of 
weekly production for households in the reference group in the matched file to the KTUS. 
Although the average values of weekly household production hours in the matched file are as 
much as 38 percent lower than in the KTUS for some categories, those categories have 
relatively few households in them. Meanwhile, the ratios for the two adult households (the most 
numerous groups) are all within 10 percent. Thus, the distribution of household production is 
well preserved in the matching process, even at this level of detail. 
Overall, the quality of the match is very good. It has its limitations, but given the overall 
misalignment of the two source datasets, the results are quite good. The overall distribution is 
transferred with reasonable accuracy, and the distributions within even small sub-groups, such 
as one adult with two children, is transferred with good precision. 
Labor Market Simulation 
Data and Methods 
The purpose of the simulation is to assess the first order impacts of policies aimed at alleviating 
income poverty in Korea via jobs policies—for example, an employer of last resort (ELR) 
policy. In the case of Korea, substantial subsidies for childcare are used to promote women’s 
labor force participation. These subsidies need to be taken into account in the estimation of time 
and income poverty. As such, the simulation is a three-step procedure. The first step is imputing 
the earnings and the hours of employment of those to-be-assigned jobs, and adjusting the 
household income of households with members who have been assigned jobs. The second step 
is to impute the new hours of household production of individuals in households affected by job 
assignments. The third step is to impute the new levels of household total household production, 
as well as childcare hours, both privately paid for and subsidized, for the households with job 
recipients. Using these three steps, we can estimate the impact of a given policy on time and 
income poverty, both overall and on individual households. We first discuss the policy scenario, 
then the steps involved in constructing the estimated outcome of the policy. 
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 For the sake of clarity of the plot, only the number of children and number of adults are used. 
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Policy Scenario 
A very simplified job assignment scenario is envisioned in the LIMTIP Korea project: that all 
eligible adults
34
 in households below the adjusted income poverty line that are not working 
receive paid (either regular or irregular) employment.
35
 The donor pool contains all adults 
currently working for pay. After eligible adults are assigned a job, with hours and earnings, the 
household income of households with eligible adult(s) is recalculated by adding the imputed 
amount of household earnings to the previous amount of household income. We assume that 
none of the other components (i.e., other than earnings) of household income undergo any 
change, so we incorporate the maximum income effect of additional employment in our 
simulation. This assumption is, obviously, unrealistic for households that receive means-tested 
income transfers or receive income transfers that depend on employment status. Thus the effect 
of this assumption is to bias the results of our simulation in the direction of greater income 
poverty alleviation, since we are adding earnings but not subtracting transfers that might be lost 
as a result.
36
 
Once the employment and income simulation is complete, the hours of household production of 
individuals needs to be estimated in all households that contain job recipients. The recipient 
pool contains all adults living in households that contain at least one job recipient. The donor 
pool contains all adults living in households in which all eligible adults are engaged in 
employment. The final step is imputing new total household production hours in combination 
with childcare hours contracted, both privately paid for and publically subsidized, for the 
households that included job recipients. The unit of analysis in this final step is the household 
itself. The donor pool contains all households that have all eligible adults working for pay. The 
recipient pool comprises all households with a recipient of a job in the first step. When we 
reassign total household production hours, we divide these hours up and assign them to 
individuals within the household using the shares of household production calculated with the 
results of the second step. Once all these steps have taken place, we can recalculate LIMTIP 
                                                          
34
 Eligible adults are defined as all individuals between the ages of 18 and 54 who are not disabled, retired, or in 
school.  
35
 An exception will be noted in the discussion of the labor force simulation. 
36
 The average total transfers for individuals in adjusted consumption-poor households receiving transfers is 221 
thousand Won per month, compared to the average adjusted poverty line for such individuals of 1.5 million Won 
per month. 
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using the imputed values for time use, income, and childcare services contracted. We now 
describe the method for each step in detail. 
Labor Force Simulation 
This simulation follows the method developed in prior research on time and income poverty, 
which built on research done at the Levy Institute to estimate the impact of the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 on US income inequality. The problem here is to 
assign hours and earnings to individuals receiving paid employment. The method for assigning 
hours and earnings is a hot-decking procedure (for a review of hot-decking, see Andridge and 
Little 2010). We use a nearest-neighbor method called affinity scoring to get a pool of records 
from which to match each record within matching cells determined by age, sex, and education. 
Before the hot-decking, we assign an industry and occupation to each job recipient. We also 
generate imputed wages and hours of work using a three-stage Heckit procedure. These four 
variables are used in the hot-decking assignment of hours and earnings. In addition to hours and 
earnings, we assign industry, occupation and employment type (formal or informal). 
Industry, Occupation, and Employment Type 
The first step in assigning jobs to recipients is to determine what are the likeliest industry, 
occupation, and employment type for each of the recipients. This is done using a multinomial 
logit procedure. Industry, occupation, and employment type are regressed on age, age squared, 
sex, marital status, education and geographic region in the donor pool. The likelihood for each 
industry and occupation is then predicted in the recipient pool, using the results of the 
multinomial logit. Then each recipient is assigned the likeliest industry and occupation using 
those predicted likelihoods. 
Imputed Hours and Earnings 
The imputations for the earnings and usual weekly hours of paid work are performed using a 
three-stage Heckit procedure (Berndt 1996, p. 627) separately for each combination of six age 
categories and sex. The first stage is a probit estimation of labor force participation: 
 1i ilf X      (0) 
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The vector of explanatory variables, X, comprises the number of children aged less than 1, 1–2, 
3–5, 6–12, and 13–17 in the household, the individual’s education, and the individual’s spouse’s 
age, education, and labor force status. The regression is run on the universe of all eligible adults. 
The Mills Ratio is calculated for all individuals using the results of the first stage regression: 
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Where f is the normal density function, F is the normal distribution function, 
^
lf is the estimated 
probability of labor force participation, and ^
lf
 is the standard deviation of 
^
lf .  
The second stage is an OLS estimate of the log of hourly wage: 
 2 2 2ln i iw Z         (0) 
The regression is run only on those individuals that are actually employed for pay. The vector of 
explanatory variables, Z, in this stage includes the individual’s education, age, marital status, 
industry, occupation, employment type, spouse’s labor force status, and finally, λ, the Mills 
Ratio calculated in the first stage. Inclusion of the Mills Ratio corrects for the selection bias 
induced by limiting the regression to those in paid employment. The imputed log of wage is 
predicted for donors and recipients from the results of the regression, with industry, occupation, 
and employment type replaced for the latter by the assigned industries, occupations, and 
employment types from the first step.  
The third stage is a regression of usual hours of paid work per week: 
 
^
3 3 3lni i ih Z w           (0) 
The regression is once again run only on those in paid employment. The vector of explanatory 
variables, Z, in this stage is the same as the previous stage, with the addition of the number of 
children aged less than 1, 1–2, 3–5, 6–12, and 13–17 in the household. Finally, the imputed 
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wage predicted in the second stage and the Mills Ratio calculated in the first stage are included. 
Imputed hours per week are predicted for donors and recipients using the results of the 
regression, replacing the industry and occupation of the latter with their assigned values. The 
results of the last two stages give us the remaining variables with which we perform the hot-
decking procedure to assign earnings, hours, industry, occupation and employment type. 
Jobs Assignment 
We can now assign earnings, usual hours of work, industry, occupation and employment type to 
those individuals in the recipient pool. The assignment method is statistical matching with hot-
decking. The matches are performed within cells formed from combinations of age, sex and 
educational attainment. The variables used to assess nearness of match are family type; marital 
status; spouse’s labor force status; educational attainment; full-time/part-time status; assigned 
industry; occupation; employment type; the number of children aged less than 1, 1–2, 3–5, 6–
12, and 13–17 in the household; and the two imputed variables—log of wage and hours worked. 
Industry and occupation are the most heavily weighted variables with employment type as the 
next most heavily weighted variable. Next are imputed hours and wage, followed by family type 
and spouse’s full-time/part-time status, then marital status and spouse’s education and labor 
force status, and then the variables detailing the number of children in the household. The 
selection of matches is done using affinity scoring. 
Once the hot-decking is finished, we compare new earnings to previous earnings. In this 
employment simulation, there were a small number of individuals who actually reported 
earnings and who ended up with simulated earnings that were lower than their actually reported 
earnings. We removed these records from the pool of recipients and left their employment-
related data unchanged. For the remaining recipients, we revised their household income by 
adding the total of the difference between the imputed amount of earnings and the actually 
reported earnings in the household (the sum of earnings differences of all recipients in the 
household) to the pre-simulation amount of household income.  
Time Use Reallocation 
We assume that as a result of the job assignment, the time use pattern of each adult individual in 
the households that contain one or more job recipients (as adjusted) from the first stage will 
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change. All adults in the recipient households are considered “eligible” for time use reallocation. 
We use a second round of hot-decking to assign new weekly hours of household production, 
new hours caring for young children (since we will be reassigning childcare hours contracted in 
the next stage), and new commuting hours to each of the adults, based on updated labor force 
participation variables for the recipients of jobs in the first stage. The method is the same as the 
first stage, with the exception of the matching variables used and their relative weighting in the 
procedure. In this stage, the variables used to assess nearness of match are family type, marital 
status, spouse’s full-time/part-time status, number of adults, number of children, and the number 
of children aged less than 1, 1–2, 3–5, 6–12, and 13–17 in the household; household income; the 
income share of each individual;
37
 and the two imputed variables from the first stage—earnings 
and usual weekly hours of employment. Household income and labor force status are updated to 
reflect the increased earnings and the new job assignments received in the previous stage. In this 
round of hot-decking, the number of children and number of adults in the household are 
weighted most heavily of all the variables. The next most heavily weighted variables are family 
type and imputed usual hours of paid employment from the first stage. These are followed by 
three variables detailing the number of young children in the household, household income, and 
income share followed by the remaining four employment-related variables assigned in the 
previous hot-decking step, and then the remaining variables detailing the number of older 
children in the household. For each match, the weekly hours of household production are 
transferred. We now have the time use variables necessary to recalculate time and income 
poverty, but we still need to adjust household childcare hours and total household production 
hours to reflect the new, higher household incomes and hours of paid work of recipient 
households. 
Household Time Use and Childcare Services Reassignment 
In order to estimate the change in total household hours of household production and caring for 
young children as well as childcare services paid for and subsidized for recipient households, we 
do a third hot-decking procedure, this time at the household level. In this stage we construct 
cells using the number of children and the number of adults in the household and do all of the 
                                                          
37
 Income share is included to reflect changes in bargaining power within the household and its impact on the 
distribution of household production work. 
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assignments within these cells. The matching variables are family type, age and educational 
achievement of the household head, assigned or actual employment type of the household head, 
the spouse of the household head’s age, educational achievement and assigned or actual 
employment type, the number of nonworking adults in the household, and the number of young 
children. In addition, we use the mother of the children in the household’s full-time/part-time 
status (either actual or assigned), as well as the adjusted household income and imputed total 
household hours of household production and paid work hours. The family type variable was 
weighted most heavily, followed by the number of young children. The next most heavily 
weighted variables were the number of earners and nonworking adults in the household, the 
imputed total household production, paid work hours, and the mother’s full-time/part-time 
status, followed by the imputed household income. Next were the household head’s educational 
status and the head’s spouse’s employment type.  
For each match we transferred household monthly privately purchased and publically subsidized 
childcare hours, the total hours of household production and the total household hours of caring 
for young children. Finally we used the imputed or actual shares of household production from 
the second round of hot-decking to divide up the imputed household total hours of household 
production among individuals in the household. We then similarly divided up the total hours of 
caring for young children among household members. The resulting data set can now be used to 
estimate time and income poverty as a result of the simulation. We move now to an assessment 
of the quality of the simulation results. 
Quality Assessment 
Assessing the quality of this type of simulation is difficult since we are producing a 
counterfactual distribution of earnings, time use, and the number of childcare hours contracted. 
The assessment is therefore limited to comparing the latter qualities among sub-groups of donor 
and recipient records. Since the recipient and donor pools are not balanced in terms of 
underlying characteristics, there is no reason to think that the resulting distributions should be 
similar to the distributions in the donor pools. Nevertheless, lacking alternatives, we do compare 
them. 
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First we compare the compositions of the recipient and donor pools for the first stage in the 
simulation. Figure A3 presents the breakdown of the recipients and donors by matching cell 
(based on sex, age and education, with the percentages representing the share of the female and 
male recipient and donor pools). We can see that among women, the members of the donor pool 
are somewhat evenly distributed by education and tend to be younger, while those in the 
recipient pool tend to be on the older side, and concentrated among high school graduates and 
those with some post-secondary education. Among men, the distribution by age is quite similar 
for the donor and recipient pools, while recipients are slightly less educated overall. To some 
extent, the unbalance in the donor and recipient pools will tilt the results of the simulation, 
especially in the cases where there are significantly fewer donors than recipients. However our 
method is tailored to make sure that we are matching individuals that are as similar as possible. 
We can compare the industry, occupation, and employment type assigned in the employment 
simulation to the likeliest industry, occupation, and employment type calculated in the first step 
of our procedure. This comparison is presented in tables A8, A9, and A10, respectively. As we 
can see, the assignment matched the likely industry in 95 percent of cases, while for both 
occupation and employment type, the match rate was over 98 percent. Assessing the earnings 
imputation is less straightforward for the reasons mentioned above. If the recipient pool has 
characteristics that are associated with lower earnings (as is the case), we would expect lower 
earnings—not similar earnings—among recipients compared to donors. We do, however, 
compare the assigned earnings to actual earnings by matching cell to check that the results are 
plausible. Figure A4 displays the ratio of mean and median assigned monthly earnings to actual 
monthly earnings for each combination of sex, age and education. The shaded area represents a 
band of plus or minus 20 percent from equivalence—a sweet spot. The worst ratio is that for 
women aged 45 to 54 with a college degree. Fortunately, this group represents only 2,100 of the 
621,000 recipients in the simulation. Generally, the more populated a cell with donors and 
recipients is, the closer the results of the simulation are to the donor pool. Figure 5 displays the 
same ratios for usual weekly hours of work. The results here are clearly superior. It is intuitively 
obvious that it should be so since there is much lower variation in weekly hours of paid work 
than in earnings.  
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Turning to the estimation of weekly hours of household production, caring for young children, 
and commuting time, we again first compare the recipient and donor pools. Figure 6 shows the 
comparison by matching cell. The recipient pool has many fewer individuals in the 55 to 64 and 
65 and older categories, since the earnings pool was restricted to households with adults who 
were not working and 55 years old. The donor pool is more evenly distributed, although still 
more heavily weighted towards younger individuals. Once again, the recipient pool includes 
relatively more individuals that are less educated than does the donor pool. This is again more 
pronounced for women, although both donor and recipient pools have a majority of women with 
high school diplomas or less. Figure A7 presents a comparison based on sex, number of children 
in the household and number of adults.  Here we see that most males and females in both the 
donor and recipient pools are in households with no children and two or more adults. Large 
numbers are also found in households with one child and three or more adults and two children 
and two adults, but the portions are larger in the recipient than the donor pool. The relatively 
balanced nature of the demographic characteristics in the recipient and donor pools makes the 
following comparisons perhaps more meaningful. 
Figures A8 and A9 contain ratios of recipients’ mean and median assigned weekly hours of 
household production to donors’ actual mean and median hours, again by matching cells and by 
sex, number of children, and number of adults, respectively. The results show that the 
distribution of assigned weekly hours by matching cell resembles the actual distribution of the 
donor pool, at least in the case of the more populated subgroups. Among women with high 
school diplomas or less (comprising 75 percent of the women in the recipient pool), the average 
weekly hours are off by as much as 33 percent. This is slightly higher than we would like to see, 
but does not look unreasonable. For men, the averages are all slightly higher in the recipient 
pool and the medians are much higher, at least in percentage terms. However the denominator is 
small in all cases, exaggerating the percentage variation, and where it is largest, the cell sizes are 
small. For example, the worst case is for the median weekly hours of household production for 
men aged 65 or older with college degrees. The recipient (there is only one record in the 
recipient pool in this cell) received 46 hours, while the median for the donor pool is 4 hours. 
Since this record represents only 484 individuals, this variation will not affect the overall results 
appreciably. Overall, the cases that are the furthest from equivalence are among elderly men and 
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women, and these cells were, again, lightly populated. The comparison by sex and household 
composition is even better-looking. The worst case is for single males living alone who received 
a median of 18 weekly hours compared to the donor pool median of six hours. However, this 
represents 19,000 recipients out of 1.3 million in the whole simulation. 
The final assessment we do is of the total household production and caring for young children, 
and publically subsidized and privately-paid-for childcare hours. This step happens at the 
household level. In this case the recipient and donor pools are divided up into cells based on the 
number of children and number of adults in the household. Figure A10 presents the comparison 
of the composition of the recipient and donor pools by these matching cells. In terms of the 
number of children, more donor households have none compared to the recipient households. 
However, since matching happens within these cells, there is no chance of a childless donor 
household being matched with a recipient household with 3 or more children. Figure A11 
presents the ratio of the mean and median of the variables transferred in the third round of hot-
decking in the recipient pool to those in the donor pool. In the most populated groups, especially 
the two-adult households, we see that most ratios are close to unity. There are some large 
differences in these groups, such as the two-adult, one-child households, in which the recipients 
receive about 21 hours of publically subsidized care compared to the 7 hours for the donors. 
This is unsurprising given the fact that the donors include all households regardless of their 
income, while the recipients are all adjusted income-poor households. None of the values for the 
transferred variables seem implausible.  
Conclusion 
To the best of our ability to judge, the simulation looks like a reasonable approximation of the 
impact on individual adjusted income-poor households of all eligible adults acquiring paid 
employment. The results of the simulation will tend to give an optimistic view of the impact of 
such employment transitions, since we do not account for loss of means-tested transfers. 
Nevertheless, the results should shed an interesting light on the impact of employment 
promotion on income poverty in Korea. 
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Tables 
Table A1 Comparison of Actual and Predicted Presence in the Poverty Band for the KWPS 2009 Data for 
South Korea 
 
 
Poverty 
Band 
Predicted Poverty 
Band Total 
0 1 
0 80.63 4.05 84.68 
1 4.44 10.88 15.32 
Total 85.07 14.93 100 
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Table A2 Alignment of Strata Variables, South Korea  
  KWPS 2009 KTUS 2009 Difference 
Population 43,219,236 43,297,959 -78,723 
Number of Children in Household       
0 55.65% 58.52% 2.87% 
1 17.22% 17.01% -0.21% 
2 23.04% 20.83% -2.21% 
3+ 4.09% 3.64% -0.45% 
Number of Adults (18yrs and Over) in 
Household       
1 17.56% 20.79% 3.23% 
2 53.31% 55.21% 1.90% 
3+ 29.13% 23.99% -5.14% 
Household is within the Poverty Band (y/n)       
No 84.66% 80.40% -4.26% 
Yes 15.34% 19.60% 4.26% 
Presence of Non-employed Adult in Household (y/n)   
No 39.62% 46.71% 7.09% 
Yes 60.38% 53.29% -7.09% 
Household Income Category       
Less than 1,500,000 won 24.12% 30.36% 6.24% 
1,500,000 to 2,499,999 won 18.54% 21.00% 2.46% 
2,500,000 to 3,499,999 won 18.31% 19.21% 0.90% 
3,500,000 to 4,999,999 won 18.14% 17.08% -1.06% 
5,000,000 won or more 20.88% 12.35% -8.53% 
Gender       
Male 49.76% 49.40% -0.36% 
Female 50.24% 50.60% 0.36% 
Individual is Employed (y/n)       
No 46.67% 43.78% -2.89% 
Yes 53.33% 56.22% 2.89% 
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Table A3 Distribution of Matched Records by Matching Round, South Korea  
 
 
 
Table A4 Distribution of Weekly Hours of Household Production in KTUS 2009 and Matched File 
 
 
Table A5 Comparison of Mean and Median Time Use Variables in Matched File to KTUS 2009 
 
Round
Matched 
Individuals Percent
Cumulative 
Percentage
1 30,023,820  69.5% 69.5%
2 3,046,900    7.0% 76.5%
3 431,694       1.0% 77.5%
4 2,836,124    6.6% 84.1%
5 368,664       0.9% 84.9%
6 279,794       0.6% 85.6%
7 118,028       0.3% 85.9%
8 224,546       0.5% 86.4%
9 1,287,745    3.0% 89.4%
10 147,355       0.3% 89.7%
11 503,805       1.2% 90.9%
12 318,167       0.7% 91.6%
13 506,900       1.2% 92.8%
14 1,301,080    3.0% 95.8%
15 234,521       0.5% 96.3%
16 597,816       1.4% 97.7%
17 263,293       0.6% 98.3%
18 728,951       1.7% 100.0%
Total 43,219,202 100.0%
p90/p10 p90/p50 p50/p10 p75/p25 p75/p50 p50/p25 Gini
KTUS 2009          . 6.225               . 34.125    3.412      10.000    0.627      
MATCH          . 6.125               . 27.300    3.412      8.000      0.625      
Average Core Procurement Care
Household 
Production
KTUS 2009 9.97 1.08 3.47 14.51
MATCH 9.88 1.05 3.41 14.37
Ratio 99.10% 97.22% 98.27% 99.04%
Median Core Procurement Care
Household 
Production
KTUS 2009 4.08 0.00 0.00 6.67
MATCH 4.08 0.00 0.00 6.67
Ratio 100.00% 100.00%
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Table A6 Mean and Median Weekly Hours of Household Production by Strata Variable, KTUS 2009 and 
Matched File 
 
 
 
 
Mean Weekly Hours of Household Production
KTUS 2009 MATCH Ratio
Core 9.97 9.88 99.1%
Procurement 1.08 1.05 97.2%
Care 3.47 3.41 98.3%
Household Production 14.51 14.37 99.0%
KTUS 2009 MATCH
0 Children 13.22 13.29 100.5%
1 Child 16.12 15.26 94.7% 1/0 1.22 1.15
2 Children 15.74 15.72 99.9% 2/0 1.19 1.18
3 or More Children 15.83 15.46 97.7% 3+/0 1.20 1.16
1 Adult 14.07 14.41 102.4%
2  Adults 16.54 16.71 101.0% 2/1 1.18 1.16
3 or More Adults 11.66 11.80 101.2% 3+/1 0.83 0.82
No 11.49 11.72 102.0% Yes/No 1.46 1.34
Yes 16.83 15.70 93.3%
No 14.07 14.03 99.7% Yes/No 1.22 1.20
Yes 17.17 16.77 97.7%
Less than 1,500,000 Won 17.00 17.10 100.6%
1,500,000 to 2,499,999 Won 15.73 15.44 98.2% 2nd/1st 0.93 0.90
2,500,000 to 3,499,999 Won 14.78 15.46 104.6% 3rd/1st 0.94 1.00
3,500,000 to 4,999,999 Won 12.50 12.94 103.5% 4th/1st 0.85 0.84
5,000,000 Won or More 11.99 12.23 102.0% Top/1st 0.96 0.95
No 19.31 18.42 95.4% Yes/No 0.56 0.59
Yes 10.77 10.83 100.6%
Male 23.74 23.14 97.5% Fem/Male 0.21 0.24
Female 5.06 5.52 109.1%
Within Poverty Band (Y/N)
Household Income Category
Sex
Employed (Y/N)
Number of Children
Non-employed Adult in Household (Y/N)
Number of Adults
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Median Weekly Hours of Household Production
KTUS 2009 MATCH Ratio
Core 4.08 4.08 100.0%
Procurement 0.00 0.00
Care 0.00 0.00
Household Production 6.67 6.67 100.0%
KTUS 2009 MATCH
0 Children 7.58 7.58 100.0%
1 Child 7.00 6.42 91.7% 1/0 0.53 0.48
2 Children 5.25 5.00 95.2% 2/0 0.40 0.38
3 or More Children 4.50 4.17 92.7% 3+/0 0.34 0.31
1 Adult 10.67 11.67 109.4%
2  Adults 8.00 7.67 95.9% 2/1 0.57 0.53
3 or More Adults 4.08 4.67 114.5% 3+/1 0.29 0.32
No 6.00 6.42 107.0% yes/no 1.17 1.09
Yes 7.00 7.00 100.0%
No 5.83 6.00 102.9% yes/no 2.20 2.04
Yes 12.83 12.25 95.5%
Less than 1,500,000 Won 12.50 12.83 102.6%
1,500,000 to 2,499,999 Won 7.00 7.00 100.0% 2nd/1st 0.56 0.55
2,500,000 to 3,499,999 Won 5.33 5.83 109.4% 3rd/1st 0.76 0.83
3,500,000 to 4,999,999 Won 4.67 5.00 107.1% 4th/1st 0.88 0.86
5,000,000 Won or More 4.67 5.25 112.4% Top/1st 1.00 1.05
No 9.33 9.33 100.0% Yes/No 0.62 0.59
Yes 5.83 5.50 94.3%
Male 20.17 19.25 95.4% Fem/Male 0.09 0.12
Female 1.75 2.33 133.1%
Number of Adults
Sex
Employed (Y/N)
Household Income Category
Within Poverty Band (Y/N)
Number of Children
Non-employed Adult in Household (Y/N)
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Table A7 Ratio of Matched to KTUS 2009 Average Hours of Household Production for the Reference 
Groups 
 
 
1 2 3+
0 111.3% 99.7% 110.4%
1 71.8% 93.8% 86.9%
2 87.3% 110.1% 94.4%
3+ 62.0% 94.8% 88.2%
Number of 
Children
Number of Adults
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Table A8 Likely and Assigned Industries for Labor Market Simulation Recipients 
Assigned Industry 
Likely Industry 
Agriculture, 
Forestry, 
Fishery Manufacturing 
Accommodation 
and Restaurant All Others         Total 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishery 
                      
9,386  
                             
-    
                             
-    
                             
-    
                      
9,386  
Manufacturing 
                         
993  
                 
324,786  
                      
5,489  
                      
4,594  
                 
335,862  
Construction 
                             
-    
                      
5,623  
                             
-    
                             
-    
                      
5,623  
Whole/Retail Sale 
                             
-    
                             
-    
                      
4,772  
                             
-    
                      
4,772  
Transportation 
                             
-    
                         
518  
                             
-    
                             
-    
                         
518  
Accommodation and Restaurant 
                             
-    
                             
-    
                   
54,647  
                      
2,629  
                   
57,276  
All Others 
                             
-    
                             
-    
                      
1,773  
                 
221,447  
                 
223,220  
Total 
                   
10,379  
                 
330,927  
                   
66,681  
                 
228,670  
                 
636,657  
Percent Match 90.4% 98.1% 82.0% 96.8% 95.9% 
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Table A9 Likely and Assigned Occupations for Labor Market Simulation Recipients 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
professional 
occupations
Office and 
Administrative 
Support 
Occupations
Service 
Occupations
Sales 
Occupations
Farming, 
Fishing, and 
Forestry 
Occupations
Craft and 
Related 
Occupations 
Machine 
Operation and 
Production 
Occupations
Manual 
Work 
Occupations Total
Professional 
Occupations 126,142         -                -               -               -                -              -                  -               126,142     
Office and 
Administrative 
Support Occupations -                58,351           -               -               -                -              -                  -               58,351       
Service Occupations -                7,068             1,609            -               -                -              -                  -               8,677         
Sales Occupations -                -                -               6,591            -                -              -                  -               6,591         
Farming, Fishing, and 
Forestry Occupations -                -                -               -               9,386             -              -                  -               9,386         
Craft and Related 
Occupations -                -                -               -               -                31,812        -                  -               31,812       
Machine Operation 
and Production 
Occupations -                -                -               -               -                -              124,889           3,443           128,332     
Manual Work 
Occupations -                4,426             -               -               -                -              -                  262,940        267,366     
Total 126,142         69,845           1,609            6,591            9,386             31,812        124,889           266,383        636,657     
Percent Match 100.0% 83.5% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 98.7% 97.7%
Assigned Occupation
Likely Occupation
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Table A10 Likely and Assigned Employment Types for Labor Market Simulation Recipients 
Assigned Class of Worker 
Likely Class of Worker 
Regular 
Employee 
Irregular 
Employee 
Employer and 
Self-employed Total 
Regular Employee 
                 
363,902  
                             
-    
                             
-    
                 
363,902  
Irregular Employee 
                   
20,277  
                 
244,632  
                             
-    
                 
264,909  
Employer and Self-employed 
                             
-    
                             
-    
                      
7,846  
                      
7,846  
Total 
                 
384,179  
                 
244,632  
                      
7,846  
                 
636,657  
Percent Match 94.7% 100.0% 100.0% 96.8% 
90 
 
Figures 
Figure A1 Ratio of Mean HH Production by Category (Match/KTUS 2009) 
 
Figure A2 Household Production by Reference Groups, KTUS 2009 and Matched File 
 
Number of
Kids
Number of
Adults
In Poverty
Band
Non-emp.
Adult in
HH
HH Income Employed Sex Overall
cat1 100.5% 100.6%
cat2 94.7% 102.4% 99.7% 102.0% 98.2% 95.4% 97.5% 99.0%
cat3 99.9% 101.0% 97.7% 93.3% 104.6% 100.6% 109.1% 100.0%
cat4 97.7% 101.2% 103.5%
cat5 102.0%
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Figure A3 Donor and Recipient Pools for Labor Force Simulation by Sex, Age and Education 
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Figure A4 Ratios of Mean and Median Earned Income by Sex, Age and Education 
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Figure A5 Ratios of Mean and Median Usual Hours of Work by Sex, Age and Education 
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Figure A6 Donor and Recipient Pools for Time Use Simulation by Sex, Age and Education 
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Figure A7 Donor and Recipient Pools for Time Use Simulation by Sex, Number of Adults and Number of 
Children 
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Figure A8 Ratios of Mean and Median Weekly Hours of Household Production by Sex, Age and Education 
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Figure A9 Ratios of Mean and Median Weekly Hours of Household Production by Sex, Number of 
Adults and Number of Children 
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Figure A10 Donor and Recipient Pools for Childcare Hours Simulation by Number of Adults and 
Number of Children 
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Figure A11 Ratios of Mean and Median Household Total Weekly Hours of Household Production, Privately Purchased and Publically Subsidized 
Childcare by Number of Children and Number of Adults 
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APPENDIX B: IMPUTATION OF OUTSOURCED HOURS OF 
CHILDCARE 
This appendix describes the imputation of purchased and subsidized hours of childcare obtained 
by households with young children. As described in Section 2, we require for the imputation the 
individual's share in the household of total outsourced hours. To this end, we used the observed 
share of the individual in the combined total of the hours that all their household members spent 
on caring for children.
38
 This is similar to the assumption that we made regarding the share of the 
individual in the household-level requirements of household production. The observed shares 
were obtained directly from the matched file. A comparison of the shares of men and women in 
the total hours spent by their household in caring for children against the shares in household 
production as a whole is shown in Figure B1. Compared to the gender disparity in the share of 
household production as a whole, the disparity in the share of caring for young children appears 
to be less.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
38
 A small proportion (10 percent) of households that outsourced childcare reported zero hours of in-home care of 
children by individuals in the household. To overcome the problem posed by this for the assignment of the time 
relief from outsourcing childcare to individuals, we imputed hours of in-home childcare to each individual in the 
household, added up the hours across all individuals in the household and then obtained the share of each individual 
in the household total. The imputed shares were used in assigning the time relief from outsourcing to each individual 
in the household. In order to impute hours of in-home childcare, we first estimated separate Tobit models of 
childcare hours for males and females in households that outsourced childcare and reported positive hours of in-
home childcare. The independent variables used in the models were dummies for being under the age of 18, not 
employed, living in a household with two adults, living in a household with three or more adults, living in a 
household with two children, and living in a household with three or more children. Then, the estimated models 
were used to predict the hours of in-home childcare of individuals in households that outsourced childcare, but 
reported zero hours of in-home care of children by individuals in the household. 
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Figure B1 Person’s Share in the Total Hours of Time Spent by their Household on Caring for Young 
Children (Left Panel) and All Household Production Activities (Right Panel) (Persons 18 to 70 Years Old 
in Households with at Least One Child Six Years or Younger) 
  
Hours of government-paid care and purchased care were derived via process of imputation from 
the reported information on the value of vouchers received and out-of-pocket expenditures on 
childcare (OOPC). Among households with young children, 33 percent had only OOPC, 33 
percent used a combination of vouchers and OOPC, 26 percent used neither, and 7 percent used 
only vouchers (Figure B2). 
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Figure B2 Percentage of Households with Young Children and Young Children (Households Incurring 
Out-of-pocket Expenditures on Children (OOPC) and/or Receiving Government Vouchers) by Type of 
Childcare Arrangement 
 
In order to translate the OOPC into hours of purchased childcare, we estimated the hourly cost of 
privately-paid-for childcare. The latter was estimated from a reference group of households. 
Specifically, a household had to meet the following conditions to belong to the reference group: 
 The household incurred only OOPC and received no vouchers 
 The household had only one young child 
 The only adults in the household were either the head or spouse of the head; or, a single 
female head that was the mother of the children in the household. In both types of 
households, the adult(s) had to be employed full time. 
We imposed the restriction of households with no adults other than the head or spouse to 
minimize the possibility that childcare needs would be met by others in the household (e.g., an 
older sibling or grandparent). The restriction of full-time employment was placed so that we 
could be relatively certain that the parent(s) would have to rely on others to provide care to their 
young children on a regular basis. We believe that the two conditions, along with the restriction 
that the household had only a single young child, allows us to assume that the household would 
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child in the reference group as OOPC per week divided by 40 hours.
39
 The resulting estimates 
are shown in Table B1. 
Table B1 Average Hourly Cost of Privately-paid-for Childcare Per Child by Age Group 
Age group Cost 
Less than 3 years 2256 
3 to 4 years 2036 
5 to 6 years 1715 
The OOPC reported in the data pertained to the total expenditures on all children in the 
household; that is, childcare expenditures are not broken down by each child in the household. 
Indeed, this was our motivation for restricting the reference group to consist only of households 
with a single young child. We obtained the hours of privately-paid-for childcare for households 
with a single child using their reported OOPC and the appropriate hourly cost from Table 1. For 
households with more than one young child, we calculated an hourly cost for all children in the 
household by averaging the hourly costs from Table 1. Clearly, the resulting hourly cost would 
vary among households depending on the number and ages of young children. The hourly cost 
was used to translate the OOPC into hours of privately-paid-for hours of childcare, with the 
provision that such hours would not exceed the maximum hours of full-time care required by the 
young children in the household.
40
 
As noted above, the survey did not provide any information on the hours of childcare financed 
by government vouchers but only the value of the vouchers received by the household. 
Imputation of hours of care obtained via government vouchers were imputed separately for (a) 
households that used a combination of vouchers and OOPC to meet their childcare needs; and, 
(b) households that only used vouchers. To obtain the estimates for the first group, we began by 
                                                          
39
 We used three age groups in the calculation: less than 3 years, 3–4 years, and 5–6 years. 
40
 The maximum weekly hours of full-time care required by the young children in the household was assumed to be 
equal to the number of young kids multiplied by 40. Without such a cap on hours, it would appear that some 
households leave their children with care providers for unrealistically large number of hours. 
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constructing a reference group. A household had to meet the following conditions to belong to 
the reference group: 
 The household incurred OOPC and received vouchers 
 The only adults in the household were either the head or spouse of the head; or, a single 
female head that was the mother of the children in the household. In both types of 
households, the adult(s) had to be employed full-time. 
We assumed that, for the reference group, the total hours of childcare met via OOPC and 
vouchers was equal to the maximum hours of full-time care required by the young children in the 
household. Our rationale for this assumption is two-fold. First, the very fact that the households 
incur OOPC indicates that the hours of care obtained via vouchers were not sufficient to meet 
their needs. Second, households in the reference group require full-time care because the adult(s) 
in the household are in full-time employment. On the basis of this assumption, we calculated the 
hours of care provided for young children in the reference group via vouchers by subtracting the 
hours of privately-paid-for hours from the maximum hours of full-time care. 
For the remaining households that incurred OOPC and used vouchers (i.e., households not in the 
reference group), we imputed hours of care provided by vouchers on the basis of the summary 
statistics for the reference group. Specifically, we calculated, by the value of vouchers and 
number of children,
41
 the mean value and standard error of the hours of care provided via 
vouchers in the reference group. Next, we assigned hours to households that were not in the 
reference group on the basis of a formula that added together the mean value and a random 
“noise” term that was derived from the standard error of the mean, with the provision that the 
resulting value would not exceed its maximum possible value. The latter was set by subtracting 
the hours of privately-paid-for hours from the maximum hours of full-time care. 
                                                          
41
 We categorized the number of young children in the household into two groups: one child and two or more 
children (there were only very few households with three young children).  Households with one young child were 
divided into three groups based on the monthly value of vouchers they received: less than ₩100,000, ₩100,000–
₩150,000, and above ₩150,000.  Households with two or more young children were grouped into two groups 
(because of the small number of observations in the reference group): less than ₩250,000, and above ₩250,000. 
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The final group of households in the imputation process was households that received only 
vouchers and incurred no OOPC. We implemented an imputation that was identical to the 
imputation for households that were not in the reference group among households that incurred 
OOPC and used vouchers. Of course, the reference group in this instance was different. To 
belong to the reference group, a household has to satisfy the following conditions: 
 The household incurred OOPC and received vouchers 
 The amount of its OOPC did not exceed the 25th percentile value of OOPC of households 
with the same number of young children
42
 
We imposed the second restriction to ensure that we would impute hours that resembled as much 
as possible the hours of subsidized care obtained by households that spent very little of their own 
money on childcare. 
To summarize: The hours of childcare obtained by households with young children via OOPC or 
government vouchers cannot be observed directly in the data. We imputed the hours in 
successive stages by utilizing the information on OOPC and value of vouchers. First, we derived 
an estimate of the average hourly cost per child (of a given age) of unsubsidized care. This 
hourly cost was used to construct an hourly cost for all children in the household because OOPC 
is not reported separately for individual children in the household. Using the latter, we calculated 
the hours of care obtained by OOPC. In the next stage, we derived the hours of care financed by 
vouchers as a residual from the maximum hours of full-time care for households that incurred 
OOPC and received vouchers. Finally, the hours of care financed by vouchers for households 
that received only vouchers were imputed on the basis of the hours of such care obtained by 
households that, in addition to receiving the vouchers, spent very little of their own money on 
childcare. 
                                                          
42
 Households were grouped into those with one young child and those with two or more young children. 
